IOWA COUNTY ATTORNEYS  ASSOCIATION

United States Supreme Court Cases -- Criminal
2002 cases

Board of Education v. Earls, _ U.S. _, _ S.Ct._, _L.Ed._ (2002) (No. 01-332, United States Supreme Court filed June 27, 2002). Justice Thomas.   Drug testing of students involved in extracurricular activities.  School board policy requiring all middle and high school students involved in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing is reasonably related to a governmental interest in detecting and preventing drug use among the students and does not violate the Fourth Amendment; the school board need not show a particularized or pervasive drug problem before instituting such a policy because students who wish to participate in such activities have a lesser expectation of privacy and therefore no right to a particularized suspicion standard, the urine collection procedure is private (use of a closed bathroom stall), the results are confidential and provided only to those with a “need to know,” and the consequences for test failure are non criminal and limited to disqualification from the activity.

Hope v. Pelzer, _ U.S. _, _ S.Ct._, _L.Ed._ (2002) (No. 01-309, United States Supreme Court filed June 27, 2002). Justice Stevens. Cruel and unusual punishment of prisoner -- hitching to post.  Allegations that guards hitched a prisoner to a post in the sun and denied him water and bathroom breaks, under circumstances which served no penal purpose and which constituted only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and the substantial risk of harm state a claim that the Eighth Amendment was violated; moreover, officials alleged responsible for such actions may not be granted summary judgment on a claimed lack of notice and qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 merely because no factually similar case had ever been decided. The proper test for “lack of notice/qualified immunity” at summary judgment is whether the state of the law at the time of the conduct complained of gave officials fair warning that their treatment of the person was unconstitutional, not whether a fact-specific case or fact-specific regulation existed at the time of the conduct.

Kirk v. Louisiana,  __ U.S. _, 122 S.Ct. 2458, _L.Ed._ (2002) (No. 01-8419, United States Supreme Court filed June 24, 2002). Per Curiam. Probable cause alone not sufficient to enter home without warrant.  "Probable cause" standing alone, is not a sufficient justification for entry into a home without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment “has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house” and in the absence of exigent circumstances, an entry without a warrant is unconstitutional.

Ring v. Arizona, _ U.S. _, _ S.Ct._, _L.Ed._ (2002) (No. 01-488, United States Supreme Court filed June 24, 2002). Justice Ginsburg.  Right to jury trial -- increase in punishment contingent on particular finding of fact requires jury to determine that fact.  The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires that “if a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Arizona law which permits a judge at sentencing to find an aggravating “sentencing factor” and therefore, impose the death penalty-where under the jury verdict, the defendant would not have been eligible for capital punishment-violates the Sixth Amendment, relying upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and expressly overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).)

United States v. Ruiz, _ U.S. _, 122 S.Ct. 2450, _L.Ed._ (2002) (No. 01-595, United States Supreme Court filed June 24, 2002). Justice Bryer. Government disclosure of impeachment witness re informants.  The Constitution does not require government disclosure of potential impeachment information regarding informants or other witnesses before entering into a binding plea agreement; impeachment information is significant in terms of a fair trial, but “a constitutional obligation to provide impeachment information during plea bargaining, prior to entry of a guilty plea, could seriously interfere with the Government’s interest in securing those guilty pleas that are factually justified, desired by defendants, and help to secure the efficient administration of justice.”

June 20, 2002 cases

Atkins v. Virginia, _ U.S. _, _ S.Ct._, _L.Ed._ (2002) (No. 00-8452, United States Supreme Court filed June 20, 2002). Justice Stevens. Cruel and unusual punishment:  execution of the mentally retarded prohibited.   
Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of mentally retarded persons, overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Since Penry, eighteen states and the U.S. government have forbidden capital punishment for mentally retarded persons, a fact which provides objective guideposts for the Eighth Amendment’s test of determining “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” This legislative action is consistent with the Courts’ judgment that, while mentally retarded persons should not be exempt from criminal sanctions, they have a diminished personal culpability for their actions so that neither retribution nor deterrence is properly served by executing the mentally retarded.

June 17, 2002 case

United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. ___ (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 01-631) (6/17/2002).  [1] Search and seizure -- no "seizure" of bus passengers, under totality of circumstances, during drug interdiction. No seizure of bus passengers who were approached by police officer during drug interdiction encounter (bus had made a scheduled stop during which it was to be cleaned and refueled so that passengers disembarked; upon reembarking, 3 officers entered bus and one questioned passengers). Court disavows 11^th Circuit’s apparent per se rule suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to drug interdiction stops based on the officers’ failure to advise bus passengers that they could refuse to cooperate. In finding no "seizure", Court noted the following facts: "[t]here was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, and not even an authoritative tone of voice." The display of a badge and presence of holstered firearms did not contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter so as to render it a seizure, nor did the presence of an officer at the front and back of the bus, as they did and said nothing to intimidate the passengers or suggest they could not leave. The fact that only a few passengers had refused to cooperate in the past did not suggest that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter. Finally, the fact that the person sitting next to defendant had just been arrested did not militate in favor of a finding of seizure; if anything, that arrest should have put defendant on notice of the consequences of continuing the encounter. [2] Consent to search -- not invalidated by officer failure to inform of right not to cooperate. Consent to suspicionless search where bus passengers were not informed of their right NOT to cooperate during encounter in which police officer approached and asked questions to request their consent to search was valid given the totality of the circumstances. Consent was voluntary: nothing the officer said indicated a command to consent to the search; officer asked permission to check bag; officer asked defendant if he objected to a search of his person, indicating to a reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse. "While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Although officer did not inform defendant of his right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search, and the totality indicates that consent was voluntary and the searches reasonable. 

Mickens v. Taylor, ___ U.S.___ (Sup. Ct. No. 00-9285) (U.S. 3/27/2002) Conflict of interest: court fails to inquire into before or during trial: defendant must establish adverse effect on representation in a post-trial claim.  In order for a defendant AFTER trial to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation based on allegations of defense counsel’s conflict of interest, during trial in which (1) the trial court failed to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known and (2) defense counsel did not object on this ground, defendant must establish that a conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 00-9285) (March 27, 2002).

Leaving several questions open, the United States Supreme Court reviewed previous cases it believed to be relevant. It first noted that automatic reversal has been required where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over a timely objection, unless the trial court had determined that there was no conflict. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). It then noted its holding in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) that absent objection, a defendant must demonstrate a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation. Finally, it held that Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), which directed the trial court to grant a new hearing if it determined that an actual conflict of interested existed, does NOT stand for the proposition that where the trial judge neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict, the defendant need only show that his lawyer was subject to a conflict of interest, as opposed to showing that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. NOTE: To the extent that State v. Watson, 620 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 2000) suggests that reversal automatically follows a post-trial claim that trial court failed to make the required inquiry into a conflict of interest, it is inconsistent with Mickens. (This opinion may be viewed at ICAA web site at the following location: http://www.iowa-icaa.com//Updates/Criminal/USSCT/current/mickens.pdf)