multiple theft or forgery charges as provided by statute, it is not required to do so nor is the district court required to merge multiple offenses into one offense for sentencing purposes. [4] Consecutive sentences and due process -- proof of all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), has no application to the court's authority to order consecutive sentences without requiring the State to charge aggravating factors or prove such factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Statutes that afford discretion with a sentencing court to impose consecutive sentences do not violate due process. [5] Recusal by judge on remand. Only personal bias or prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source stand as disqualifying factors per se; defendant's convictions did not result from a bench trial and the Supreme Court finds no basis for concluding that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in failing to recuse himself. [6] Reasons for consecutive sentence -- same as for denying probation. "The fact that the reason given ... for consecutive sentences was the same reason ... for not granting defendant probation does not present a basis for rejecting that reason as the controlling consideration for the imposition of consecutive sentences." The reason (the high degree of culpability for an enormity of 30 crimes of which defendant was convicted) adequately supported the decision as to both the denial of probation and the imposition of consecutive sentences.

State v. Miller, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 00-644) (Iowa 12/19/2001). Speedy trial. State's one-day delay in providing defendant speedy trial was not supported by "good cause" for missing the deadline. Defendant timely filed his pretrial motions. The last available regular trial date in Marshall County before the speedy-trial deadline was November 30 but the court's ruling on the motions was not filed until December 2; thirty-eight days after the hearing and seven days before the speedy-trial deadline. The trial was set for the next available trial date following the ruling, one day after the speedy trial period ran. "Given [defendant's] demand for speedy trial and strict adherence to pretrial deadline, only a strong reason would justify departure from [rule 27's] mandate. Unfortunately the record before us furnishes no reason for the delay, let alone a strong one. As a result, we cannot say the court properly exercised its limited discretion under the rule."