STATE v. KOLBET, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 99-46) (Iowa 11/15/2001) [1] Evidence -- use of false testimony -- standards. The prosecution's knowing use of false testimony requires a conviction be reversed if there is any reasonable likelihood the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Further, the prosecutor need not have actually known the testimony was false, if he or she "should" have known. [2] Use of false testimony of rebuttal witness found. The State's use of rebuttal testimony, found in post-trial motion to be expressly contradicted by the materials on which the witness relied, constituted a reckless disregard for the truth. Court also found a strong likelihood that the testimony could have affected the verdict and reversed on that ground.  [3]  Determination of prejudice from false evidence.  Court declines to rely on evidence of intoxication in determining the prejudicial effect of errant testimony where the jury acquitted on OWI-related charges. [4] Evidence -- reliability for jury. The reliability of trained trooper's speed estimates was a question for the jury. [5] Statutes -- single subject constitutional challenge. Constitutional challenge under "single subject" clause is untimely if not urged before the act is codified. [6] Equal protection. Section 707.6A does not violate equal protection guarantees. [7] Homicide or serious injury by vehicle -- due process challenges. Section 707.6A contains a mens rea element -- willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others -- so as not to violate the due process clause; additionally, a cause-in-fact requirement is clearly spelled out as an element of the offense. [8] Implied consent -- reasonable cause. The investigating officers did not lack reasonable cause to invoke the implied-consent provisions of section 321J.6. [9] Motion to suppress -- procurement of defendant's blood. The court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress on the basis that his consent to the taking of his blood was invalidly obtained. [10] Evidence handling. The Court is unable to conclude that the manner in which the blood sample was handled tainted the results. [11] Jury's knowledge of possible penalties -- no abuse of discretion. The court was well within its discretion to keep information regarding the possible penalties from the jury. [12] Defense witness list -- error in requiring. The court erred in requiring defendant to submit a list of his witnesses to the prosecution for aid in voir dire. [13] Jury view of crime scene. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the jury to view the car or the crime scene. [14] Recusal -- no abuse of discretion in determining unnecessary. Record did not support finding of abuse of discretion in the determination that recusal was not necessary because judge had experienced family loss at the hands of a drunk driver.  (Rehearing being sought)

STATE v. KONCHALSKI, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 00-1394) (Iowa 11/15/2001) [1] Restitution -- due process challenge to section 910.3B award. Neither substantive nor procedural due process challenge existed for defendant's section 910.3B ($150,000) restitutionary order. [2] Restitution -- excessive fines. Section 910.3B restitution statute does not impose an excessive fine in voluntary manslaughter cases.

STATE v. KRESS, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 00-1173) (Iowa 11/15/2001). [1] Mandatory minimum for obtaining controlled substances by forgery (section 155A.24). One-third mandatory minimum sentencing provisions apply to violations of section 155A.24 by virtue of its ties to section 124.413 and in turn 124.401. [2] Drug provision properly categorized as a sentencing provision, not limitation on parole. The court concludes that section 124.413 is a sentencing provision and overrules Kinnersley v. State, 494 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1993), Luter v. State, 343 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa 1984), and State v. Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa 1982), to the extent they hold otherwise. [3] Ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was ineffective in failing to either correct the court's misinformation about the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions or to file a motion in arrest of judgment raising the issue, resulting in prejudice to the defendant.