STATE v. REEVES, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 00-481) (Iowa 11/15/2001). Second-degree murder: deliberation and premeditation not required. Second-degree murder only requires proof of malice aforethought, not deliberation and premeditation. (Overruling State v. Love, 302 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 1981), and its progeny regarding the inference of malice accompanying the use of a deadly weapon, which in turn referenced an opportunity to deliberate: "[t]he use of a deadly weapon, accompanied by an opportunity to deliberate, even for a short time, is evidence of malice".)

STATE v. RODRIQUEZ, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 00-763) (Iowa 11/15/2001). [1] 404(b) prior acts evidence. No abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic abuse by the defendant against the victim, as bearing on the kidnapping elements of confinement, intent to cause serious injury and intent to secretly confine. [2] "Subsequent bad act" evidence. Error, if any, in admitting evidence of a subsequent act of domestic violence was harmless. [3] Battered women's syndrome expert evidence. No abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony on battered women's syndrome, as assisting the jury on the significance and meaning of the defendant's conduct and victim's reaction as well as assisting on disputed issues of confinement and intent. [4] Unpreserved claims not reviewable on appeal. Defendant failed to preserve error on his claim the trial judge was not impartial. [5] Lesser included offenses -- domestic abuse. Domestic abuse assault is not a lesser included offense of willful injury (as d.a. requires additional element of particular type of relationship).

STATE v. SUTTON, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 99-1245) (Iowa 11/15/2001) Sufficiency of the evidence -- aiding and abetting vehicular homicide. Insufficient evidence existed on the "recklessness" element of vehicular homicide to support passenger's conviction as aider and abettor of driver whose vehicle struck and killed a child. "Recklessness" under section 707.6A(2)(a) requires a showing of conduct "fraught with a high degree of danger, conduct so dangerous that the defendant knew or should have foreseen that harm would flow from it." The driver's actions may have been negligent but were not "such an extreme departure from ordinary care as to constitute recklessness." This finding reinforces the conclusion that defendant's conviction, as the vehicle's passenger, could not stand.