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State v. Artzer,
609 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa
4/26/2000).
[1] Ineffective assistance -- failure to
pursue a defense. Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to
pursue defenses of diminished responsibility and intoxication in a second-degree
murder case, as that crime is not a specific intent crime to which such defenses
would apply. [2] Murder -- malice, sufficient evidence of. Sufficient evidence of malice existed from
the facts that (1) defendant shot his (erstwhile long-time friend) with a
handgun and (2) witnesses overheard a confrontation between the two just prior
to the shooting. [3] Posttrial motions -- motion to continue sentencing denied. Defendant failed to
demonstrate good cause to support a delay in sentencing, or any resulting
prejudice. "[I]t was unnecessary to prolong the sentencing process for the
purpose of injecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which could be
raised on appeal or in a postconviction relief action." [4]
Pretrial motions -- continuance denied.
No abuse of discretion in
denying motion for continuance, filed by new counsel on the same day he appeared
for defendant over a month before trial, as counsel could not have known whether
additional time was necessary at that juncture and did not renew the motion
later.
State v. Izzolena,
609 N.W.2d 541 (Iowa 4/26/2000);
State v. Rohm,
609 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 4/26/2000);
State v. Klawonn,
609 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 4/26/2000) Restitution: $150,000 restitution award for felony causing death.
[1] Double Jeopardy. Without deciding whether the restitution award is a
"punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court holds that
"multiple punishment" does not occur by the imposition of the
restitution award as it occurs during sentencing in connection with a single
prosecution. [2] Excessive Fines. $150,000 restitution award for felony resulting in death --
Excessive Fines Clause. Although the $150,000 restitution award accompanying the
commission of a felony causing death is a "fine" for purposes of the
Excessive Fines Clause, it is not "excessive" so as to work a
constitutional violation, "[c]onsidering the nature of the offense,
resulting harm, and the great deference afforded the legislature." [3] Mandatory Nature of Award. The legislature’s use of the word
"shall" in authorizing the $150,000 restitution award means it is
mandatory and creates a duty upon the court to impose a restitution award
payable to the estate in the amount of at least $150,000. State v. Klawonn,
609 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 4/26/2000).
[4] Procedural Due Process. No procedural due process violation is worked by the
imposition of the $150,000 restitution award, given that the underlying findings
(for the conviction) are guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the offense has to
have constituted the proximate cause of a victim’s death, and the defendant is
able to obtain a hearing once the court issues the restitution order, at any
time during the pendency of the order. See Iowa Code section 910.7
(1997). State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541 (Iowa 4/26/2000); State v. Rohm,
609 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 4/26/2000).
[5] Substantive Due Process. No substantive due process violation where the court
finds a rational relationship between the $150,000 restitution award provisions
and the governmental interest being advanced thereby, namely, compensation to
the victim’s family and punishment for the defendant. Likewise, the court
concludes that the restitution award provisions do not conflict with the Due
Process Clause by effectively depriving an offender of the ability to enter an
Alford plea. State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 4/26/2000).
State v. Moore,
609 N.W.2d 502 (Iowa 4/26/2000) Search & seizure --
Investigative stop by DNR park ranger. Defendant drove his vehicle in a camping area at less
than the posted speed limit but at a rate a DNR park ranger deemed to pose a
danger to campers. Upon stopping defendant to warn him of that danger, the
ranger smelled alcohol on defendant’s person and radioed for help from the
Iowa State Patrol, resulting in defendant’s arrest and conviction of OWI. The
park ranger was held to have the authority to stop defendant by virtue of her
authority to engage in a "public safety function" as well as a law
enforcement function in enforcing Iowa Code section 321.285 (requiring a person
to drive "at a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than
reasonable and proper," giving regard to existing conditions) as well as by
virtue of Iowa Code section 461A.3 (granting the DNR and its employees
regulatory authority regarding "proper public access" within the State
park system).
State v. Rohm,
609 N.W.2d
504 (Iowa 4/26/2000) [1] Murder -- involuntary manslaughter,
sufficiency of "recklessness". Sufficient evidence of recklessness
existed to support defendant’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter based on
the facts set out in [a], above, as well as the fact that defendant purchased a
large quantity of liquor containing high contents of alcohol, including
190-proof grain alcohol. [2] Murder -- Involuntary manslaughter when underlying offense is "supplying alcohol
to a minor causing death". Sufficiency of element that defendant
"knowingly encouraged" consumption of alcohol by minor. Sufficient
evidence supported the finding that defendant "knowingly encouraged"
the consumption of alcohol by a minor who died of alcohol poisoning during a
party at her house hosted by her sons, notwithstanding that the drinking
activities occurred the day after a party at defendant’s house which she knew
of and for which she purchased alcohol. Part of the liquor she bought for the
party remained in the basement where the second party occurred, she knew it was
there and permitted it to remain there, she knew that young guests were
gathering in the basement again, the jury could have concluded that she knew
that the drinking had started up again, guests came and went throughout the
evening, and defendant even complained once about the noise.
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