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Sexually violent
predator act not unconstitutional on Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy
Grounds
In re Detention of
Garrin ,
620 N.W.2d_275 (Iowa 12/20/2000). Sexually
Violent Predator Act not unconstitutional. Because the Sexually
Predator Act is a civil statute, it does not implicate the state or federal Ex
Post Facto Clauses or Double Jeopardy Clauses; nor does it violate the
constitutional rights to substantive due process or equal protection. Finally,
this petitioner did not preserve his claim that the statute is vague as applied
to him and he had no standing to assert that the act is facially vague.
No Right to
Depositions in SimplesJones v. Iowa District
Court for Wapello County ,
620_N.W.2d_242 (Iowa 12/20/2000). Discovery
-- no right to depositions in simple misdemeanor case. Defendant has
neither statutory nor due process constitutional right to take depositions in
simple misdemeanor cases (here, domestic abuse).
Police action
exceeded Terry stop State v. Bradford,
620 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 12/20/2000). Warrantless
searches: Terry stop vs. search incident to arrest. Police actions of
detaining defendant at the scene of the alleged crime for almost an hour,
handcuffing him, placing him in a patrol car, and transporting him to the police
station, followed by a second search, exceeded Terry investigative search
exception. "[T]he removal of a suspect from the scene of the stop generally
marks the point at which the Fourth Amendment demands probable cause".
Although these actions constituted an arrest and not merely an investigative
stop, the arrest was supported by probable cause to believe defendant had aided
and abetted the harassment of the victim so that the warrantless search was
constitutionally permissible as incident to his arrest.
Perjury --
retraction of postconviction not sufficient to avoid charge
State v. Hawkins ,
620 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 12/20/2000). [1]
Perjury
– retraction not accomplished by simply dismissing postconviction action. Defendant
who made perjurious statements in postconviction action (claiming that his
guilty plea was involuntary because counsel coerced him to lie) was not deemed
to have retracted the statements for the purposes of avoiding a perjury charge
when he subsequently dismissed the postconviction action, without more. Further,
defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to claim that the dismissal gave
rise to the statutory defense of retraction under Iowa Code section 720.2.
Retraction involves uncovering the truth, meaning that the lie must be exposed,
admitted, and the truth told. Defendant’s dismissal of the postconviction
action accomplished none of the essence of retraction. [2]
Perjury
-- opinion or belief not generally a basis for charge. Generally, one
cannot be convicted of perjury based on testimony as to one’s opinion or
belief. However, the existence of an opinion or belief can itself be a question
of fact. Here, "the issue is whether he actually [held the belief that he
was being coerced into pleading guilty] at the time of the guilty plea or only
claimed coercion ... to support his postconviction application", a question
of fact.
Suspended sentence
allowed for OWI 3rd under certain circumstances
State v. Iowa
District Court for Mahaska County,
620 N.W.2d_271(Iowa 12/20/2000). OWI
3rd -- suspended sentence allowed upon commitment to Department of
Corrections instead of jail. District Court has power to impose
prison sentence and suspend the entire sentence for OWI 3rd offense,
notwithstanding language in section 321J.2 requiring service of "mandatory
minimum" periods of incarceration for people convicted of previous OWIs.
Under the jail/prison sentencing scheme used in Iowa, mandatory minimum jail
sentences apply only to defendants sentenced to serve their time in jail. No
mandatory minimum jail sentence is authorized for prison sentences, and no
mandatory minimum prison sentence is authorized for prison sentences.
Search warrant
challenged based on omissions in application; upheld State v. Poulin,
620_N.W.2d_287 (Iowa 12/20/2000). [1] Search warrant -- challenge based on omissions in application.
Defense counsel properly challenged search warrant on Franks grounds,
including that review of a warrant allegedly based on false information in the
form of factual omissions should take into consideration information beyond the
four corners of the warrant application. [2] Probable
cause -- sufficient corroboration of confidential informant's story, including
police knowledge of defendant and visitors' reputations. Confidential informant’s information was sufficiently corroborated by
neighbor’s reports of suspicious activities at defendant’s home, marijuana
residue found in the trash behind defendant’s apartment, and officers’
knowledge of the reputation of defendant and his visitors as drug users:
"police knowledge of reputation may be an important element in determining
probable cause".
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