JULY 6 and 17, 2000

IOWA SUPREME COURT

Rivers v. State, 615 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 7/17/2000)  Successive postconviction relief actions --  burden on defendant.  Where defendant claims ineffective counsel as a reason for failing to present an issue in his first pcr action, he must satisfy the requirements of section 822.6.  Further, if the State files a motion for summary judgment calling upon the defendant to disclose his proof under section 822.8, defendant must do so by providing specific facts and not mere legal conclusions.

State v. Barnholtz, 613 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 7/6/2000).  Making a public document.  [1] Crime of "making a public document". For an unauthorized person to "make" a public document in violation of section 718.5, a "public document" must be involved. Here, car dealers allegedly forged or presented inaccurate information in a certificate of title and a damage disclosure statement. Because their actions occurred prior to the documents being filed, "public documents" were not involved. As such, defendants did not illegally make a public document in either case. [2] Corporate culpability for crime. While a corporation can be convicted of crimes involving intent, the standards of section 703.5 must be met. Here, vehicle salesman was not demonstrated to be a "high managerial agent" of the corporation so as to have "authorized, requested, or tolerated" conduct for which the corporation would be held criminally liable.  

State v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 7/6/2000).  Sentencing -- 85% Rule – Second-Degree Murder.  Defendant convicted of 2^nd degree murder has no due process right to parole eligibility nor does the 85% rule revoke a liberty interest. Likewise, defendant has no equal protection claim as it is reasonable for the legislature to have concluded that second-degree murder "has a broad social impact warranting strict punitive measures". Finally, application of the 85% rule in defendant’s situation did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  

State v. Lambert, 612 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 7/6/2000)  Burglary -- elements and lessers.  [1] Burglary – intent to commit an assault upon entering. Sufficient evidence existed that defendant intended to assault his estranged wife when he entered her home, given that (1) he entered without permission in the middle of the night, wore gloves and carried a lead pipe; and (2) he confronted her in violation of a restraining order, threatened her with bodily injury, and assaulted her when she refused his requests. [2] Dangerous weapon -- instruction that metal pipe constituted. No error in instructing jury that metal pipe defendant used was, by law, a "dangerous weapon" given evidence that he actually used the pipe, that it was capable of inflicting serious injury, and that he intended to inflict serious injury.  [3] Lesser included offenses -- assault, 1st-degree burglary.   Simple assault is a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary under the "intentionally or recklessly inflicts bodily injury" alternative so that the two crimes merge at sentencing.  

State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 7/6/2000).  Burglary – possession of firearm "while participating", failure to instruct on elements of theft.  [1] Second-degree burglary – possession of firearm "while participating". Defendant whose burglary included stealing (but neither using nor brandishing) a firearm was nonetheless culpable of 2^nd-degree burglary: the statute merely requires possession or control of the firearm while participating in the burglary.  [2] Burglary – failure to instruct on elements of theft.  Defendant suffered no prejudice from the failure to instruct the jury on the elements of theft as the intended activity underlying a burglary, as that intent was clearly inferable from his breaking and entry of buildings and multiple thefts therefrom.  [3] Sufficiency of notice that defendant faces habitual offender charge.  State’s practice of filing original information containing habitual offender allegation, followed by substituted and supplemental information without such reference to comply with R. Cr. P. 6(5) did not mislead or deceive defendant into belief that habitual offender allegation had been dropped. Additionally, record did not support defendant’s claim that he did not understand the nature of his admission to being an habitual offender.  [4] Ineffective assistance – failure to move to sever separate charges.  Sufficient evidence existed that defendant’s burglaries were part of common scheme or plan so as to support joint trial where the burglaries were committed on 2 consecutive days, using similar methods of operation from start to finish including what was stolen.  [5] Ineffective assistance – failure to request that record be reported. Counsel was not ineffective in failing to request that opening statements, closing arguments and voir dire be reported, as defendant did not claim anything untoward occurred during any stage of these proceedings.  

State v. Wiseman, 614 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 7/6/2000).  OWI – Application of now-superseded 6-year limit on consideration of priors.  Now-outdated law that authorized the State to go back only 6 (now 12) years in determining the number of prior  OWI offenses for enhancement purposes looked at the date of the prior conviction, not guilty plea. As such, a defendant’s prior conviction occurring within the 6-year period "counted" in determining subsequent enhancement proceedings, even though his guilty plea to the same offense fell outside that period.  

State v. Woody, 613 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 7/6/2000).  [1] Guilty pleas -- Invalid plea to being habitual offender – proper remedy.  Defendant’s admission to being an habitual offender (pursuant to a plea agreement according to which the State reduced a charge of first-degree robbery to 2^nd-degree) was invalid because one of the predicate convictions occurred after the date of the subject offense. The proper remedy was not to vacate the sentence and allow withdrawal of the guilty plea as well as reinstatement of the higher charge. Although the enhanced sentence was illegal, the plea to 2^nd-degree robbery was valid. As such, the proper remedy was to vacate the illegal sentence and remand for an appropriate sentence on the 2^nd-degree robbery conviction.