March 22, 2000

IOWA SUPREME COURT

Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774 (Iowa 2000) (3/22/00).  Postconviction -- deduction of postconviction costs and attorney fees from inmate's account.  An order assessing court costs and attorney fees to inmate for postconviction action is not a criminal restitution order, it is an order pertaining to civil actions or appeals. Iowa Code section 610A.1(1) requires all inmates to pay fees and costs associated with the inmate’s civil action or appeal in the amount of 10% per month. The district court erred in ordering the inmate to pay $25.00 per month; an amount less than 10% of inmate’s costs. The court also erred in directing the department of corrections to make the withdrawal from the inmate’s prison account. While the department may deduct such items, it must first give the inmate written notice of the amount of the deduction so as to allow the inmate to object thereto. 

State v. Antenucci, 608 N.W.2d 19 (Iowa 2000) (3/22/00).  Guilty pleas -- issues waived by guilty/Alford plea. After unsuccessfully attempting to dismiss charges against him for forgery, in favor of a charge of using a stolen credit card, defendant entered an Alford plea to the original charge. Defendant was deemed to have entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty so as to have waived his challenge to the denial of his motion to dismiss. 

State v. Cain, 608 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 2000) (3/22/00).  Appeal -- bond -- surety vindicated.  District court erroneously forfeited an appeal bond posted for defendant due to application of county jail’s policy (toward recommitted prisoners) that frustrated the bond company’s attempt to surrender defendant in a timely manner. Bond company wanted to effectuate revocation of the bond when its insured was recommitted to jail on another offense. It could not do so because the recommitment occurred on a weekend and the jail policy did not allow revocation without a certified copy of the bond instrument, which were kept in the clerk of court’s office, which was closed. Defendant posted another bond and was released. He later failed to appear as required and the district court revoked his bond, notwithstanding the surety’s subsequent attempts to effectuate the revocation of bond. Chapter 811.8 provides that the surety may surrender the defendant "at any time before the forfeiture of the undertaking". The jail’s policy violated that section insofar as it did not allow surrender when defendant was recommitted, for which the Supreme Court reversed the forfeiture. 

State v. Clark, 608 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 2000) (3/22/00).  Appeal -- preservation of error -- habitual offender status. Defendant must challenge adjudication as habitual offender administratively to preserve issue for district court review. The DOT sent Clark a notice that he would be adjudicated a habitual offender if he did not appear and show cause why he should not be barred. Clark did not respond, and the agency adjudicated him as a habitual offender. Later, Clark was charged with two counts of driving while barred and possession of a controlled substance. The trial court dismissed the charges of driving while barred on the basis that the notice used by the DOT was improper, and the State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. If Clark had wanted to challenge the notice provided, he should have done so during the administrative process by using the method provided in the Administrative Procedure Act up to and including a petition for judicial review. By failing to properly challenge the agency’s decision, Clark deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue, and "the district court exceeded its authority in reviewing the agency action." 

State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 3/22/00).  Counsel -- adequacy of waiver of trial counsel. To validly waive one’s right to counsel at trial, the waiver "must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter". The waiver is knowingly made when the accused is apprised of these factors, "admonished as to the usefulness of an attorney at that particular proceeding, and made cognizant of the danger in continuing without counsel." Without a record of such a colloquy, defendant was not deemed to have knowingly and intelligently have waived his right to counsel. Further, "a harmless error analysis cannot be utilized to cure the error incurred by an invalid acceptance of a defendant’s waiver of the constitutional right to counsel and the resultant election to proceed with self-representation."  (Defendant indicated that he was "fully advised of the pitfalls claimed to be associated with one representing himself", requested and was granted standby counsel. No attempt was made on the record to ascertain exactly what defendant meant by that nor as to his professed familiarity with the justice system. Although the State contended that off-the-record discussions were engaged in regarding this choice and that defendant’s failure to produce the record dealing with these discussions waived the issues, the Court found otherwise. ‘[I]n the case at hand, it is the responsibility of the State to uphold the validity of [defendant’s] waiver of counsel.")

State v. Harrington, 608 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 3/22/00).  Sexually predatory offense - what constitutes. Conviction of lesser included offense to kidnapping – false imprisonment -- accompanied by the return of a special interrogatory finding that the crime was committed with the intent to commit sexual abuse, qualified the conviction as a sexually predatory offense. "[B]ased on the jury’s answer to the interrogatory, the false-imprisonment offense involved an attempt to commit another offense contained in section 901A.1 [sexual abuse]." Defendant’s sentence was enhanced under the sexual predator statute on the bases of (1) his stipulation that he had previously been convicted of a sexually predatory offense (which the Supreme Court held invalid in light of State v. Tornquist, 600 N.W.2d 301, 307 (Iowa 1999) on retroactivity grounds) and (2) the sentencing court’s conclusion that false imprisonment met the statutory definition of a sexually predatory offense as an attempt to commit kidnapping. In addition to overturning the sentence on Tornquist grounds, the Court held that the trial court erred in finding that the false imprisonment conviction qualified as an attempt to commit kidnapping. However, the district court would have been right for the wrong reason, as noted above.

State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 3/22/2000).  [1] Defenses -- insanity defense for factfinder. When the record reveals conflicting evidence regarding defendant’s insanity defense, evolving into a battle of the experts, the appellate court defers to the decision of the factfinder as being in a better position to weigh the witnesses’ credibility.  [2] Defenses -- insanity -- State not estopped from contesting by role in involuntary commitment proceedings. Where defendant stipulated at an involuntary commitment hearing that he had a serious mental impairment, the State did not assert any position in regard thereto (and the county attorney had intended to arrange for another county attorney or the Attorney General’s office to prosecute any commitment proceeding if needed) so as to serve as the basis for defendant’s estoppel claim. Further, the determination of whether one is seriously mentally impaired is different than the criminal insanity or diminished capacity standards so as not to trigger judicial estoppel considerations.  [3] Double jeopardy -- similar offenses but different acts.  Defendant was not subject to unconstitutional double jeopardy by his convictions for fifteen counts of theft, six counts of money laundering, one count of perjury, five counts of fraudulent practice, one count of falsifying a public document and two counts of forgery. Each conviction was based on a distinct act for which neither conviction nor punishment was improper. Likewise, defendant’s acts did not constitute a "continuous offense" so as to bar multiple punishments.   [4] Misconduct -- prosecutorial -- request for sanctions against defense counsel. While rejecting defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the Supreme Court expressed reservations about the State’s request for imposition of sanctions against defense counsel in conjunction with a motion to quash: "[t]he request for sanctions could be construed as an effort to chill the advocacy and efficacy of defense counsel." [5] Sentencing -- reasons for consecutives.  Although the sentencing court gave reasons for selecting prison over a suspended sentence, no reasons were provided for the decision to impose consecutive sentences, requiring reversal. 

State v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 3/22/00).  [1]  Search & seizure -- car trunk search: probable cause. The smell of marijuana together with the conflicting stories (between driver and passenger) and furtive movements by passenger constituted probable cause to search the whole vehicle. defendant was stopped for a seatbelt violation; the officer smelled marijuana, heard conflicting stories from the defendant and his passenger, and observed the passenger make furtive movements. The officer searched the interior of the car and found no drugs, so the officer then popped the trunk latch. A bag of marijuana, a bag of methamphetamine, and growing marijuana plants were found in the trunk.  [2] Sentencing -- consecutives after jury returns lesser convictions.   Although the jury had returned convictions on two lesser charges, the sentencing court had conducted the trial and heard the evidence, and therefore, the record contained sufficient evidence of the defendant’s guilt to support the sentencing court’s comments and its determination that consecutive sentences were appropriate in the case.  [3] Sentencing - determinate sentence followed by probation illegal. First degree harassment is an aggravated misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment not to exceed two years. As such, the sentencing court’s order imposing an 18-month period of incarceration (followed by a probationary period of 2 years) was illegal and void. Further, probation could not be ordered in the absence of a suspended or deferred judgment or sentence. Defendant not having been granted any of these options at sentencing, the probation portion of the sentencing order was also improper. 

State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 3/22/00).  Counsel -- waiver -- "forced choice" and inadequate waiver. After his unsuccessful attempt to obtain replacement counsel on conflict grounds, defendant continued his opposition to being represented by original counsel. This left defendant with a "forced choice" of self-representation, stemming from the availability of only two options: continue using present counsel or proceed pro se. Defendant insisted he did not want the attorney in the courtroom, for which the district court then relegated counsel to standby status. Counsel assumed a marginal role, sitting outside the courtroom for most of the trial and participating only in a hearing and the examination of some witnesses. On appeal, defendant challenged the validity of his waiver of counsel on appeal. While the decision to proceed pro se was deemed voluntary, it was not deemed to have been made knowingly and intelligently because the trial court did not engage in colloquy regarding the hazards of self-representation. Further, the invalid waiver was not cured by the appointment of standby counsel and that attorney’s participation in the trial; and a harmless error analysis was not applicable. 

State v. Phillips, 610 N.W.2d 840 (Iowa 3/22/00) Sentencing -- 85% rule -- as applied to 2nd-degree robbery. The statutes requiring persons convicted of 1st and 2nd degree robbery (among other offenses) to serve 85% of their sentences do not violate the (1) separation-of-powers clause (section 902.12 does not "disrupt" the balance between the legislature’s authority to provide indeterminate sentences and the parole board’s authority to determine parole eligibility and work release); (2) Bill of attainders clause (the relevant code section does not impose punishment based on a defendant’s status or without trial); (3) 8th Amendment "cruel and unusual" provision, State v. Hoskins, 586 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1998), or (4) Equal Protection clause, State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1998): there is a rational distinction between 2nd-degree robbery and other forcible felonies so as to justify different treatment. 

State v. Stephenson, 608 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 3/22/00).  Counsel -- waiver -- State’s burden and harmless error. Originally expressing a preference to act as his own attorney at trial and then vacillating on the issue, defendant was appointed standby counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the trial court did not satisfy the constitutional standards of inquiry requisite to a valid waiver of trial counsel. It further noted that the burden of proving a valid waiver is upon the State, so that defendant’s inability to produce transcripts did not result in an automatic waiver of the issue on appeal. Finally, no harmless error analysis applied where the court failed to engage in a colloquy with defendant on his decision to waive counsel. 

State v. Vargason, 607 N.W.2d 691 (Iowa 2000) (3/22/2000).  OWI -- Interstate Driver License Compact. License sanctions imposed on driver in a different state are bar to licensing in Iowa for only one year; after that time, Iowa DOT must determine licensing status in Iowa. 

State v. Weaver, 608 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 3/22/00).  [1] Confrontation clause -- pretrial discovery. The Confrontation Clause does not provide defendant with any right to pretrial or in-trial discovery of the state’s evidence so as not to have been called into play by the failure to authorize the (child sex abuse) victim’s deposition. (Defendant was also not denied his due process right to present a defense by the refusal to allow the child’s deposition; he was "only denied the opportunity to present a defense that suited his own strategy under which he did not even attempt to call the victim as a witness at trial.").  [2]  Pretrial procedures -- deposition of unlisted witness. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(2) authorizes the deposition of witnesses not listed in the minutes under "special circumstances", but only in perpetuation of testimony for use at trial, not for discovery purposes. Further, a defendant seeking to invoke the compulsory process guarantee embodied by rule 12(2) must make a plausible showing that the individual’s testimony was otherwise unavailable to the defendant and was both material and favorable to his defense. 

State v. Weaver, 608 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 3/22/00).  [1] Sexual abuse -- Sufficiency of the evidence.  Sufficient evidence was found to support defendant’s conviction of sexually abusing a young girl, based on the credibility of the witnesses as found by the court (tried without a jury) and by bloodstains on the defendant’s sweatpants that matched the victim’s DNA, as well as blood stains found on defendant’s penis which contained blood that was not the defendant’s.   [2] Sex abuse rulings:  specific.  No abuse of discretion in allowing evidence from the victim’s mother that she believed defendant had committed the assault, in anticipation of defendant’s attempt to cross-examine her on possible bias. No abuse of discretion in cross-examination of defense witness regarding a statement defendant made to her that was an admission of sorts.   No abuse of discretion in receiving evidence that the victim was happy to hear of her mother’s presence at the hospital - post-attack - and her inquiry about her sister, but of her being upset that defendant might be present. [3]  Trial -- rebuttal evidence. No abuse of discretion in allowing State to rebut the implication that it had failed to preserve evidence, by eliciting from the investigating officer that he did not take fingernail scrapings from defendant because initially he had no knowledge that there would have been any evidence in that area. 

Stradt v. State, 608 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 3/22/00).  Sentencing -- 2 subsequent offenses arising from same transaction not barred. A defendant convicted of a third and fourth felony could suffer an enhanced sentence for each even if they were part of the same transaction. In addition, enhanced sentences can be made to run consecutively under the language of the consecutive-sentence section, 901.8. (Defendant, convicted of 3rd-degree burglary and 1st-degree theft arising from the same transaction, was sentenced as an habitual offender to two (enhanced) 15-year indeterminate sentences as an habitual offender and ran them consecutively. He claimed that the habitual-offender enhancement could only be applied to one, not both, of the subsequent offenses arising out of the same transaction and that the two could not be made to run consecutively.)