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Insufficient
evidence of "possession"
State
v. Atkinson,
620 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 11/16/2000). Possession
with intent to deliver – insufficient evidence that defendant
"possessed" methamphetamine. Insufficient evidence
existed to find that defendant, the passenger in a vehicle she did not
own, constructively possessed a fanny pack belonging to the driver
(her ex-husband) placed under the driver’s seat. While she knew of
the presence and nature of the drugs, her mere proximity to the fanny
pack containing them was insufficient to constitute "dominion and
control" so as to satisfy that element of constructive
possession. Relevant considerations noted by the Court include whether
(1) the contraband was in plain view, (2) it was with defendant’s
personal effects, (3) it was found on the same side of the car seat as
the defendant, or immediately next to him or her (4) the defendant was
owner of the vehicle and (5) there was suspicious activity by the
defendant.
Warrantless search
of vehicle: no probable cause
State
v. Gillespie ,
619 N.W.2d 345 (Iowa 11/16/2000) (abrogated on grounds not set out
here -- deference given to fact finder's findings when reviewing
constitutional claims by State
v. Turner,
630 N.W.2d 601 (July 2001) and abrogation recognized by State v.
Maddox, 665 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003))
Warrantless
search of vehicle – no probable cause. No
probable cause existed to justify the warrantless search of
defendant’s vehicle: the fact that a vehicle was seen by the
arresting officer leaving an area at a high speed near the site of
several recent thefts (an anhydrous ammonia facility) did not amount
to probable cause, there was no evidence that a crime had been
committed at the time or that the officer was responding to or
investigating a crime in progress, no one was seen leaving the
facility itself, the vehicle’s headlights were not seen pointing
toward the facility, and the driver’s statement that he did not
realize he was being pursued by a police officer was consistent with
the officer’s non-use of flashing red lights, siren, or loudspeaker
until shortly before defendant stopped.
Sentencing -- no
abuse of discretion
State
v. Grandberry,
619 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa 11/16/2000). Sentencing
– no abuse of discretion. Presentence
investigation report revealing default judgments against defendant on
traffic charges for failing to appear provided sufficient proof that
the defendant did not appear in court for the charges, resulting in
convictions. As such, the sentencing court did not abuse its
discretion in relying on the prior traffic charges and his failure to
appear in court on the charges. Although his convictions of traffic
offenses resulted from his failure to appear in court so as not to
have been technically "prosecuted" therefor, the charges
were not "unproven" and could be considered during
sentencing for a subsequent offense. Finally, all facts contained
within the presentence investigation report that are not denied by
defendant stand as admitted.
Terry stop:
officer's motivation does not control
State
v. Heminover,
619 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 11/16/2000). Terry
(investigative) stops – officer’s motivation does not control
legitimacy. "[I]n Terry stop cases the motivation
of the officer stopping the vehicle is not controlling, and the
officer is not bound by the real reasons for the stop. The test for a Terry
stop and one based on probable cause is the same: objective. The State
is therefore not limited to the reasons stated by the investigating
officer in justifying a Terry stop." As such, a driver who
illegally backed into a very busy highway to avoid an illegal
roadblock presented a particularized and objective basis to suspect
the commission of a traffic offense (improper backing) to justify a Terry
stop.
Conflict-of-interest
claim waived
State
v. LaRue ,
619 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 11/16/2000). Guilty
pleas -- waiver of purported conflict-of-interest claim. Defendant
waived his claim that his plea and conviction was invalid on the basis
that his first attorney, for whom he obtained substitute counsel prior
to arraignment, subsequently represented defendant’s co-defendant
(who had been the first attorney’s client prior to the subject
crime). When defendant’s attorney has a conflict of interest, that
attorney should be disqualified. Here, the conflict was from former
counsel’s involvement. The court held that it had "no occasion
to consider if this rule should be extended when former counsel
represents a co-defendant in the same proceeding" because
defendant’s informed guilty plea waived both this and an
accompanying ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Sufficient
evidence of interference with official acts
State
v. Maring ,
619 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 11/16/2000). Interference
with official acts. Sufficient
evidence existed to support the finding that defendant was the driver
of a vehicle who eluded law enforcement by exiting the car after a
high-speed chase and fleeing on foot: "the vehicle was registered
to him, his wallet was inside of it, and he matched the physical
description of the individual the trooper saw fleeing from the
car." (Court also notes in a footnote that the reviewing court
must view all of the evidence, not just that supporting the verdict,
in determining evidentiary sufficiency, overruling State v. Turk,
595 N.W.2d 819, 821 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) but consistent with the vast
majority of opinions facing such challenges).
Murder: no
"year and a day" limitation on prosecution
State
v. Ruesga ,
619 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 11/16/2000) [1]
Murder – no "year-and-a-day" rule limiting the prosecution
of murder based on victim’s date of death. Iowa does not
recognize any former or common-law rule or defense that, for one to be
prosecuted for causing the death of another, the victim’s death must
occur within a year and a day from the date of death-causing injury.
(Child victim lived six years after defendant inflict death-resulting
injuries). [2]
Double jeopardy – conviction for underlying offense does not bar
subsequent prosecution for higher charges after victim dies. First,
the underlying offense is not a "lesser included" offense of
felony murder. Second, even if such a relationship existed, an
exception exists where the second prosecution on higher charges stems
from additional facts that "have not occurred or been discovered
at the time the lesser charge is prosecuted." [3]
Motion to continue. No abuse of discretion in denying
defendant’s pro se motion to continue. Defense counsel had already
sought and obtained a five-week continuance and change of venue; and
denied that additional time was necessary to prepare. [4]
Motion to proceed pro se. Defendant’
admission that he could not competently cross-examine the State’s
witnesses and his consent to "hybrid" representation by
counsel provided no grounds for reversal on Sixth Amendment
"right to proceed pro se" grounds.
Testimony
regarding co-defendant's
acquittal constituted reversible error
State
v. Scott ,
619 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 11/16/2000). [1]
Evidence – prosecutor establishes that co-defendant in drug
possession case was acquitted. State’s redirect examination
of passenger/co-defendant (after defense counsel attempted to cast
doubt on her testimony that subject drugs belonged to defendant)
establishing that she was acquitted of same drug charges, constituted
reversible error. Co-defendant’s guilt or innocence is not relevant
to the issue of defendant’s guilt or innocence. [2]
No "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule under Iowa
Constitution – claim need not have been raised in motion to
suppress. Defendant was entitled to rely on an Iowa Supreme
Court opinion establishing that the Iowa constitution does not
recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for illegal
searches even though that claim was not specifically urged in the
motion to suppress because the decision had not then been rendered (State
v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293-93 (Iowa 2000).) [3].
Drug offenses – "keeping a vehicle for possessing or
distributing" drugs. Trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to argue that "keeping and maintaining a premises for
drug activity under the statute requires some continuity and that an
isolated incident would be insufficient," as later established in
State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Iowa 1999).
Conflict of
interest: requisite showing of prejudice when no objection is
lodged but hearing should have been held
State
v. Watson, 620
N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 11/16/2000). [1]
Right to counsel -- requisite showing of prejudice when no objection
is lodged but hearing should have been held. Where the trial
court knows or should have known of a conflict of interest in
counsel’s representation of the defendant, "reversal is
required without a showing that the conflict adversely affected
counsel’s performance, even though no objection was made at
trial." If the appellate record shows only the possibility of a
conflict, remand is necessary to determine whether an actual conflict
existed and/or whether defendant validly waived his right to
independent counsel. If trial court did not know or should not have
known of an actual conflict and defendant failed to object, the
defendant must demonstrate an actual conflict adversely affected
counsel’s performance, in the context of an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. NOTE:
To the extent that this case suggests that reversal automatically
follows a post-trial claim that trial court failed to make the
required inquiry into a conflict of interest, it is inconsistent with
a subsequent opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Mickens
v. Taylor, ___ U.S. ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 00-9285) (U.S. 3/7/2002). [2]
Right to counsel – existence of conflict of interest.
Defense counsel had an actual conflict of interest where he
simultaneously represented (a) a key prosecution witness who testified
that defendant confessed to the murder while they were cellmates, and
(b) the defendant. The witness received a favorable sentence on his
contempt charge prior to testifying against the defendant about the
confession. Defense counsel was ethically bound to maintain the
witness’s confidences and secrets and not to use information gained
in the attorney-client relationship even after termination of that
relationship. The impeachment of the witness would have been
embarrassing to the witness but would have been helpful to the
defendant, establishing an actual conflict that survived the
termination of the attorney-client relationship with the witness and
extended to all members of the Public Defenders Office.
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