SEPTEMBER 7, 2000

IOWA SUPREME COURT

City of Cedar Rapids v. Atsinger, 617 N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 9/7/2000)  Uniform traffic citations – insufficient to initiate prosecution. A uniform traffic citation does not qualify as the constitutionally- required "information under oath" because its contents are not sworn to under oath in the presence of someone empowered by law to administer oaths.

In re the detention of Elroy Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 9/7/2000). Sexually violent predator act – Equal Protection and Due Process challenges. [1] No equal protection violation. Sexually violent predators are not similarly situated to other violent offenders, as the others are not sexual in nature. This difference provides an adequate basis on which to treat sexually violent predators. In additional, a rational basis exists for the classification. [2] No due process violation. Because he did not proceed to trial before a jury, defendant was not subjected to the asserted risk flowing from his claim that he could not attain a fair trial before a jury given the evidence of prior sexually violent offenses.

State v. Beecher, 616 N.W.2d 532 (Iowa 9/7/2000) Double jeopardy – stalking and contempt proceedings. Because jeopardy had not attached, the district court erred in requiring the State to dismiss either its stalking charge or contempt proceedings for violating a no-contact order. Additionally, the violation of a protective order (the act underlying defendant’s contempt charges) is not an element of class "D" felony stalking (while subject to restrictions contained in a criminal or civil protective order or injunction) so as to render defendant’s contempt charge a lesser included offense of the stalking charge. The "stalking" subsection pertaining to protective orders is a sentencing enhancement provision, not an element of the offense. Finally, stalking is not a continuous offense so as to prohibit multiple convictions based on a single course of conduct where the State does not charge multiple offenses of stalking.

State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 9/7/2000). 85% rule – juveniles. The "85%" minimum sentence provisions applicable to adult perpetrators of 2^nd degree robbery also apply to juveniles prosecuted and sentenced as adults for the same crime, notwithstanding that the statute vesting original jurisdiction in the district court, § 232.8(1)(c), does not explicitly mention the "85% statute". §§ 902.12, 903A.2(1)(b).

State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 9/7/2000) [1] Warrantless searches – officer’s reasons not controlling. The State is not limited to the reasons given by an investigating officer in justifying the challenged search or seizure, overruling prior cases to the contrary. The constitutional reasonableness of a search is determined by an objective standard. [2] Reasonable suspicion vs. probable cause. Defendant’s presence in an area known for illegal drug activity as well as her attempted flight upon the arrival of police officers gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that she might be involved in illegal activity, but not probable cause. [3] Iowa constitutional search and seizure clause: no "good faith" exception.  "Good faith" of the investigating officers does not excuse a violation of Iowa’s article I, section 8 search and seizure clause so as to permit the admission of evidence obtained in dereliction of the constitution. In addition to the purpose for which the federal courts apply the rule in 4^th Amendment contexts, deterring unlawful police conduct, Iowa’s exclusionary rule (1) provides a remedy for the Iowa constitutional violation, (2) protects the integrity of the courts in disallowing illegally obtained evidence, and (3) "prompts more care and attention at all stages of the warrant-issuing process, including by the judicial officers issuing the warrant" as well as encouraging lawmakers to ensure the constitutionality of their laws. These factors preclude the application of a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule.

State v. Cortez, 617 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 9/7/2000). [1] Drug crimes – leniency for marijuana possession is "off" when other-drug conviction occurs. Iowa Code section 124.401(5) does not entitle a defendant previously convicted of two drug possession charges (marijuana and methamphetamine) to be charged with second-offense marijuana possession thereafter merely because the statute provides different recidivist provisions depending on the type of drug previously possessed. The statute is intended to provide leniency to those charged exclusively with marijuana offenses. Once convicted of an offense involving other substances, the prior and any subsequent charges can be used to enhance the defendant’s sentence under the non-marijuana (felony) track. [2] Double jeopardy – void sentence does not invoke. The double jeopardy clause does not come into play when a defendant seeks to avoid resentencing after the original sentence is declared void. [3] Guilty plea – invalidation. District court’s misconstruction of sentencing statute so pervaded defendant’s guilty plea as to require remand for pleading anew.

State v. Corwin, 616 N.W.2d 600 (Iowa 9/7/2000) Ex post facto -- $150,000 restitution order. Application of restitution statute requiring payment of $150,000 for felony resulting in death was improper where defendant was resentenced after the enactment of the law authorizing such orders. That statute, section 910.3B, bears the hallmarks of a penal statute so as to bar its application to defendants whose crime occurred prior to the statute’s effective date.

State v. Garcia, 616 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 9/7/2000). [1] Intervening and superseding cause. Unless it is the sole cause of death, even gross negligence by medical personnel in the treatment of injuries caused by defendant and leading to the victim’s death will not relieve defendant of criminal responsibility. An intervening and superseding cause that will be sufficient to break defendant’s causal connection exists where, for example, a victim being treated for a knife wound is found to have a hernia and dies during surgery to repair the hernia. [2] Breach of attorney-client relationship. Attorney did not breach an attorney-client relationship by giving prosecutors a letter from defendant to the brother of a co-defendant. The letter was received by the intended recipient’s mother, who then gave it to the attorney. At that time, the attorney was not defendant’s lawyer so there was no attorney-client privilege. Second, no prejudice occurred because the State did not introduce the letter into evidence.

State v. Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, 616 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 9/7/2000) 85% rule – juveniles. 85% minimum sentence provision is considered a judicial decision for the sentencing court, not an administrative decision for the Department of Corrections and Board of Parole, so as to be ripe for the Supreme Court’s consideration of defendant’s sentence on direct appeal. Further, the minimum sentence applies to a juvenile whose crime subjects him to the original jurisdiction of the district court.

State v. Prior, 617 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 9/7/2000). [1] "All persons" search warrants – requirements. Warrants authorizing the search of "all persons present" are not per se unreasonable, but the requirements for a valid warrant of this type are stringent. The application for such a warrant must set out: (1) the character of the premises (including location, size, and public or private character), (2) the nature of the illegal conduct at issue, (3) the number and behavior of persons expected to be present when the warrant is to be executed, (4) whether any persons unconnected with the alleged illegal activity have been seen on the premises, and (5) the precise area and time in which the alleged activity is to take place. Here, the subject private residence did not exhibit signs of being used exclusively or even primarily as a drug house and the traffic pattern as described implied the possibility of non-drug-transaction use of the apartment. No investigation or surveillance was undertaken to determine (1) whether all persons who entered the apartment were involved in drugs, (2) the amount of Time visitors would spend in the apartment, or (3) the time of the suspicious activity. Because the affidavit did not satisfy the requisite standards nor was the warrant narrowly tailored to the facts creating probable cause, the "all persons" portion was invalid.  [2] Probable cause to search without a warrant. Statutory search "incident-to-execution-of-a- warrant" (Iowa Code sec. 808.7) was not supported by probable cause that defendant was (1) in possession of evidence to be seized, (2) committing a crime or (3) a threat to officer safety. Defendant merely entered the place being searched as the companion of a person named in the search warrant affidavit but not identified as a perpetrator nor subject of the search warrant. [3]  No good faith exception. As in State v. Cline (see above), Court declines to recognize "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule precluding admission of evidence obtained in violation of Iowa constitutional search and seizure provisions.

State v. Ramirez, 616 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 9/7/2000). [1] Jury instructions  – substance of defendant’s requested instruction contained in other instructions; no error. [2] 1^st degree murder – sufficiency of the evidence that defendant aided and abetted principal.  Sufficient evidence existed that defendant aided and abetted his principal in the robbery and murder of the victim. He took an active part in the planning, he drove the others to and from the murder scene, and he knew that the principal took a gun with him and was going to beat the victim. Further, sufficient corroboration existed for the accomplice’s testimony against defendant in the facts that defendant was driving the vehicle when pulled over by police shortly after the killing, and the murder weapon was hidden in the vehicle.

State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564 (Iowa 9/7/2000). [1] Preservation by motions in limine. Motion in limine which asserted both confrontation and hearsay objections to the admission of evidence did not preserve error on the confrontation ground when the trial court did not rule on the motion prior to trial and counsel re-urged only the hearsay ground at trial. [2] Confrontation – co-conspirator statements as firmly rooted exception. Statements by a codefendant in furtherance of a conspiracy "is so firmly established …[that] there is no need for a separate Confrontation Clause analysis." [3] Hearsay – co-conspirator statements. A court may consider the co-conspirator statement itself in determining the foundational question of whether a conspiracy existed. Whether hearsay statements can serve as the sole source of information that a conspiracy existed remains unanswered, as the statement here was supported by other events tending to show the existence of a conspiracy. [4] Impeachment – Brady material. Defendant failed to demonstrate that the State suppressed what would have been impeachment evidence of a witness’s earlier conviction. Defendant was not entitled to relief on this ground in any event because she could not demonstrate a reasonable probability that such evidence would have changed the result of the proceeding; the witness had been impeached on cross-examination anyway. [5] Refusal to allow defendant to recall witness. Trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in refusing defendant’s request to recall a witness to further impeach her. [6] Refusal to allow deposition of State’s rebuttal witness. Defendant was not entitled under Iowa R. Cr. P. 12(2)(a) to depose the State’s expert witness who testified in rebuttal to evidence of defendant’s claimed inability to plan a murder and report it to the police. [7] Aider and abettor – vicarious liability for intent elements. Intent element is satisfied for aider and abettor by the latter’s participation in the crime, either with the requisite intent or with the knowledge that the principal possesses the required intent. [8] Sufficient evidence existed to support defendant’s conviction for the murder of her ex-boyfriend.