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F.K.,
Mother, v. Iowa District Court for Polk County,
630 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 7/5/2001) [1]
Search and seizure --
constitutional implication of seizure pursuant to emergency temporary order.
Mother of child who was seized on the basis of facts given without oath
or affirmation, pursuant to statute authorizing emergency temporary removal
order, was not the proper party to claim a 4th Amendment violation.
Mother had no legitimate expectation of privacy as she was not personally
subjected to search or seizure, and she was not acting as child's representative
in suit. [2] Due
process -- temporary removal procedures. Pre- and post-removal
procedures contained in Iowa juvenile code provided sufficient safeguards to
satisfy federal and state due process requirements.
State
v. Beach, 630 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 7/5/2001) OWI
3rd -- sentencing option gone. When court sentences OWI 3rd
offender to community-based correctional program, and program is full, court
does not have the option of directing that "in the discretion of the
Department the Defendant's custody may be transferred ... to the Iowa Medical
and Classification Center...". The statute prior to 1996 allowed this
option but it was changed; the applicable amended statute "eliminated ...
the option of granting the district director the election to transfer the
offender to Oakdale." Iowa Code section 904.513(1)(1999).
State
v. Bousman, 630 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 7/5/2001). Nontestimonial
identification: failure to set forth facts bearing on informant's
reliability as statutorily required. Court's order for
nontestimonial identification (swabbing defendant's mouth to obtain DNA sample)
was not supported by "reasonable grounds to suspect" that defendant
had committed a felony as required by Iowa Code section 810.6(2) and the 4th
Amendment. The 4th Amendment is not offended by application of this,
rather than "probable cause" standard, given the nature of the
detention. However, "reasonable grounds to suspect" standard was
not met absent statutorily-required disclosure of facts bearing on the
informant's credibility. Iowa Code section 810.5(4) (2001). The
informant's information should not have been considered, and without that
information (the only source connecting defendant to the subject burglary) there
was not a sufficient basis for issuing the order, either statutorily or
constitutionally.
State
v. Brooks, 630 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 7/5/2001). [1]
Appeal to district court of simple
misdemeanor conviction -- delay does not warrant dismissal. Undue
delay by the district court in deciding an appeal from simple misdemeanor
convictions pursuant to Iowa R. Cr. P. 54 does not authorize dismissal of
convictions not shown to have been improperly adjudicated on the merits.
[2] Appeal of appearance
bond -- jurisdiction stays with original court.
General rule that
trial court loses jurisdiction upon perfection of an appeal does not deprive
court of jurisdiction over collateral disputes between the parties. (Court
could have proceeded to trial even though defendant was appealing appearance
bond).
State
v. Hager,
630 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 7/5/2001). Rejection
of plea agreement as tendered after court-imposed deadline. The
district court's refusal to entertain a plea agreement based solely on the
court's policy of refusing pleas on the morning of trial constitutes an abuse of
discretion. "Like the use of a fixed policy in sentencing, a fixed
plea deadline is the very antithesis of discretionary
decision-making." The trial court's good cause exception to the
deadline was not broad enough to accommodate a simple change of mind or
renegotiation of terms so as to be fixed for litigants like this defendant (who
changed her mind). "A missed plea deadline, alone, will not support
the refusal to accept a plea agreement." Additional reasons
supporting refusal might include: (1) terms of the plea bargain, (2)
proper disposition of the case, (3) any underlying impunity by defendant toward
efforts by court to control its docket through deadlines. (Dissent by
Neuman and Ternus, JJ).
State v. Iowa District Court for Johnson Co.,
630 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 7/5/2001) [1]
Consideration of PBT result in sentencing. Trial court erred in
basing deferred judgment partially on the results of defendant's preliminary
breath test, in contravention of §
321J.5(2). [2]
OWI -- deferred judgment eligibility determined by "dropping" the
third digit of a .153 test.
"The district court does
not have authority to drop the third digit of an intoxilyzer reading for any
reason." Defendant's test result of .153 was "greater than .15
in all respects" so as to deny him from eligibility for deferred
judgment. Iowa Code § 321J.2(3)(a)(1). No denial of due process is
worked by such an application.
State
v. Iowa District Court for Monroe County,
630 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 7/5/2001).
Section 901.10(1),
authorizing mitigation of certain sentences for first-time offenders,
applies only to mandatory minimum, not original sentence.
Statutory
provision allowing the court to "sentence the person to a term less than
provided by the statute...[,]" under certain circumstances for first-time
drug offenders, applies to the applicable mandatory minimum sentence referenced
in that section (901.10(1)) and not to the maximum indeterminate sentence
applicable to the underlying offense. Accordingly, the district
court exceeded its authority by sentencing the defendant to a term less than the
25-year indeterminate period required by section 902.9(1) for a Class
"B" felony drug offense.
State
v. Johnson,
630 N.W.2d 583 (Iowa 7/5/2001). Section
901.10(2) mandatory minimum sentence reductions for amphetamine or
methamphetamine offenses -- court not bound by prosecution's recommended
mitigation request.
Person whose sentence involves
methamphetamine or amphetamine offenses can have mandatory minimum sentence
reduced by 1/3rd for pleading guilty. Iowa Code §
901.10(2). In addition, if defendant cooperates in prosecution of other
persons and prosecutor recommends additional reduction, court may grant further
reduction of up to one-half of the remaining mandatory minimum
sentence. The latter provision does not mean that the court can only
reduce the remaining amount by the percentage recommended by the
prosecution. The court has discretion to determine the length of
additional reduction of sentence.
State
v. Keene,
629 N.W.2d 360 (Iowa 7/5/2001) [1] Criminal
transmission of HIV statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied.
A
person violates section 709C.1 by engaging in intimate contact with another
person while knowing he is HIV positive. "Intimate contact"
means "the intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid
of another person in a manner that could result in the transmission of the
[HIV]." "Could result" is not unconstitutionally
vague: "it must simply be shown that transmission of the HIV from the
infected person to the exposed person was possible considering the
circumstances.... any reasonably intelligent person is aware it is
possible to transmit HIV during sexual intercourse, especially when it is
unprotected." [2] Preservation
of error -- guilty pleas -- no more exception for "unconstitutionally vague
as applied" statutory claims.
Defendant's failure to file
a motion in arrest of judgment to challenge his guilty plea is not excused when
the issue is that the applicable criminal statute was unconstitutionally
vague. To the extent that such an exception was previously recognized by
the court, it does not apply to any guilty pleas accepted after State v.
Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 10/11/2000).
State
v. Keene,
630 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 7/5/2001) Guilty
pleas -- dissemination of obscene materials to a minor -- court not required to
make independent review of material claimed to be obscene.
Factual
basis was made out regarding the obscene nature of the video serving as the
basis for defendant's plea, without the court personally reviewing it, based on
the minutes of testimony which referred to several witnesses describing the
portrayal of sex acts in the subject video. Defendant acknowledged that he
had read the minutes and that the State could prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the charge at issue.
State
v. Palmer,
632
N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 7/16/2001) [1]
Failure
to give reasons for sentence excused. "[W]here
the sentence imposed is the sentence provided for in the plea
agreement, the sentence is no longer a “product of the
exercise of trial court discretion but of the process of
giving effect to the parties’ agreement.” The
purpose for stating reasons on the record serves no practical
purpose under these circumstances, and the court in merely
giving effect to the parties' agreement does not abuse its
discretion in doing so. (Unpublished opinion)
Tindell
v. State,
629 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 7/5/2001) Guilty
plea -- failure to preserve error. Defendant whose attempt at
giving a Rule 9 plea was withdrawn after being rejected by the first judge, but
who was later sentenced in accord with the provisions of the agreement (without
repeating the plea) by a second judge the same day, failed to preserve
error. Challenging the proceeding for the first time on
postconviction relief several years later when probation was revoked, defendant
was held to have waived his claim. Illegal sentences can be corrected at
any time, but defendant's claim amounted to one of procedural error so as to
be governed by normal error preservation rules.
State
v. Turner,
630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 7/5/2001) [1]
Miranda -- custody. Defendant's custodial status (being
handcuffed upon emerging from his apartment, being "secured" with two
other individuals being detained, and later being placed in an unmarked police
vehicle to conduct further investigation) did not change back to no-custody when
his handcuffs were removed when necessary to allow him to sign a
consent-to-search form. [2] Miranda -- interrogation versus volunteered
statements. Defendant's
denial of gun ownership was in response to questioning, not volunteered, so as
to complete a Miranda violation. [3] Admission of defendant's statements revealing knowledge of gun not harmless.
Insufficient evidence existed to demonstrate defendant's possession of
gun (exclusive control over the premises where contraband is found, or
contraband found in place immediately and exclusively accessible to accused and
subject to his joint or sole dominion or control); erroneous admission of
statements regarding ownership was therefore not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. [4]
Trial to the court -- effect of statement at sentencing on establishment of
judgment of acquittal. Sentencing court's statement expressing
question as to whether defendant knew how gun ended up in a particular place at
the residence, but as to defendant's knowledge of the existence of the firearm,
did not amount to judgment of acquittal (case was tried to the court; because of
erroneous ruling on motion to suppress, defendant entitled to new trial but not
acquittal).
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