May 31, 2001

IOWA SUPREME COURT

State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 2001) (5/31/2001)  [1]  Child endangerment:  vagueness -- "substantial risk."  The phrase "substantial risk" gives fair warning to those who fall in that category.  In the context of the child endangerment statute, it means "[t]he very real possibility of danger to a child's physical health or safety."  This language is sufficient to alert the average person that the following (defendant's) acts are prohibited:  driving a pickup with four small children in the cab, (two belted in with one seatbelt, one lying on the floor and the fourth completely unrestrained) nearly 20 mph over the speed limit, trying to outrun the police and finally screeching to a halt leaving 30-foot skid marks.  [2]  Child endangerment:  sufficient evidence of substantial risk.  "[W]hen evidence of the failure to properly secure young children in safety belts is combined with evidence of [defendant's] driving conduct, sufficient evidence of child endangerment exists."  [3]  "Control" over a child -- dangerous driving by defendant who is not parent or guardian.  The child endangerment statute is not limited to those with custody over a child.   Those with "control" over the child are also included.  The driver of a pickup truck has "control over the instrumentality contributing to the risk to the children in the truck" such that the word "control ... applies to a person who has the ability to control the risk that the statute prohibits."   [NOTE:  The statute has been amended to specifically include the phrase, "For the purpose of subsection 1, 'person having control over a child or a minor' means ... [a] person who operates a motor vehicle with a child ... or minor present in the vehicle."  S.F. 63, 79th G.A. sec. 4 (Iowa 2001)].

State v. Christianson, 627 N.W.2d 910 (Iowa 2001) (5/31/2001)  OWI -- inevitable discovery not available to cure implied consent invocation problem.   When reasonable grounds did not exist to believe defendant was intoxicated when a blood sample was taken pursuant to implied consent law, the "inevitable discovery" doctrine would not cure or excuse the error when reasonable grounds developed later.  "[T]he existence of reasonable grounds is a condition precedent to imposition of implied consent." 

State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa 2001) (5/31/2001) Arrest warrant -- limitations on accompanying right to enter home to execute.  "When a suspect attempts to comply with the demands of police and exits her home, police may not force her back inside to make the arrest.  The arrest warrant does provide authority to enter when the provisions of section 804.15 are met.  However, compliance by the suspect destroys this authority unless exigent circumstances exist or some other exception applies."   In other words, "where... there is no impediment to making an arrest in a doorway, ... the officers may not intrude into the house over the objection of the arrestee, simply to complete effectuation of the arrest and put the officers into a position where they can more fully observe the interior of the premises ... absent any other reasonable justification for the entry."  State v. Peterson, 700 P.2d 85, 87 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).

State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2001) (5/31/2001) Hearsay exception:  statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment made by third person.   Trial court erred in admitting murder victim's statement to a psychiatric social worker, that defendant had been coached to fake a mental condition.   The second prong for admitting the deceased's statement was met (the content was such as is reasonably relied on by physician in treatment or diagnosis), but the first prong was not: the declarant's motive must be consistent with the purposes of promoting effective treatment or diagnosis.  It is possible for such statements made by a third person to be admissible under this rule, but the statement has to be motivated by the declarant's desire to obtain effective treatment or diagnosis for another.  When, (as here) that motivation is absent, the statements are inadmissible.  Furthermore, the presumption of prejudice was not rebutted where the victim's statement concerning defendant's possible intention to fake a mental condition "went to the heart of his only defense -- diminished capacity..."  so as to required reversal.

State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 2001) (5/31/2001) Consent searches:  validity of consent ("knock and talk").  When consent to search is obtained as a result of police practice of knocking on defendant's door and asking to talk, "the validity of the encounter ultimately hinges on the voluntariness of the consent given."  Initial entry onto defendant's porch was not deemed consensual, given State's burden to prove consent, where the evidence was insufficient to objectively show defendant consented by opening the door to their entry.  This in turn affected the validity of defendant's subsequent consent to search, as the illegal entry implied authority to enter the home.  The officers' explanation (that they preferred to investigate drug complaints by looking around instead of obtaining a warrant) implied that the search was an authorized part of a normal investigative encounter.  In addition, the officers told defendant that they were not looking for small quantities of drugs, but rather "meth labs" and "major dealers", tending to create a false belief that no adverse consequences would result absent those revelations.  While there were facts tending to support voluntariness, the Court concluded that the State failed to establish the consent to search was voluntary.

State v. Wells, 629 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 2001) (5/31/2001) [1] Livestock neglect:  multiple charges  The livestock neglect statute specifically prohibits bringing multiple serious misdemeanor charges of livestock neglect when the charges stem from the same uninterrupted period of neglect.  Iowa Code sec. 717.2(2) (1997).  As such, defendant's conviction for two counts based on the deaths of two horses from neglect occurring during an uninterrupted period of neglect could not stand; defendant could be subjected to prosecution for only one count.  [2]  Search warrants:  probable cause.  Probable cause existed to support search warrant upon officer's description of dead horses accompanied by his belief, based on experience with dead animals, that horses had possibly died from starvation.  [3]  Photographic evidence:  admissibility.  Photos of dead horses and property where they were found were relevant, and court alleviated potential prejudice by excluding those that displayed severe decomposition and consumption by scavengers.  [4]  Preservation of error:  jury misconduct.  Defendant failed to preserve error on claim that jury misconduct (communication) occurred prior to closing arguments by failing to raise the issue until after the verdict was rendered.

State v. Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2001) (5/31/2001) [1] Sexually violent predators -- equal protection challenge.  Rational basis test applies to determination of equal protection challenge by sexually violent predator viz other violent offenders with antisocial disorders.  In turn, performance of that test reveals a legislative scheme rationally related to a legitimate state interest.  Persons committed under chapter 229 do not have mental illnesses that predispose them to commit sexually violent acts, and they do not have the same specialized treatment needs as sexually violent predators.  These factors justify the different classification and treatment.  [2]  Jury size:  trials for sexually violent predators.  Sexually violent predator statute (chapter 229A) is a civil statute; the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure govern its proceedings, and no error is committed by seating an 8-person jury for trial. [3]  Jury trials:  unanimity requirement.   Iowa Code section 229A.7(3) requires the jury be unanimous in finding defendant to be a sexually violent predator.  Rule of Civil Procedure 203(a) authorizing non-unanimous decisions does not apply, nor is a defendant entitled to discharge if unanimity cannot be reached.   "If the jury cannot return a unanimous verdict, the court must discharge the jury and order a new trial." [4]  Sexually violent predators:  evidence of prior offenses.  Trial court properly balanced both defendant's and State's interests, in allowing evidence of prior sexual abuse convictions but not through victim testimony. [5]  Sexually violent predators:  rebuttal testimony by victims.   No abuse of discretion in allowing the state to produce evidence from now-grown children whom defendant sexually abused in 1983, after defendant denied having had sexual contact with them.  [6]  Sexually violent predators:  "likelihood" standard.  Trial court correctly instructed the jury on the required standard of likelihood that defendant would engage in predatory acts of sexual violence in the future:  "more likely than not", as opposed to defendant's proffered version, "highly likely."  [7] Sexually violent predators:  instructing the jury on alternative remedies. "The 'secure facility' issue is part and parcel of the SVP finding under the statute, not a separate issue addressed after determining the respondent is a sexually violent predator."  Likewise, the State need not provide beyond a reasonable doubt that no less-restrictive alternative facilities are available.