State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 10/10/2001).  [1]  Second-degree robbery, assault alternative:  sufficiency of "assault" evidence.  Sufficient evidence existed to support the "assault" element of 2nd degree robbery where defendant entered a convenience store with a brown bag over his head and socks on his hands, demanded money from the lone clerk while in close proximity to her, took the money, told the clerk to lie down, and then left.  A perpetrator's disguised appearance can give rise to an assault.  The totality of these facts provided the fact finder with a basis for inferring that defendant's actions -- verbal and nonverbal -- were intended to place the clerk in fear of immediate physical contact that would be painful, injurious or offensive. [2]  Simple assault [708.1(2)] a specific intent crime.  Iowa code section 708.1(2) states that to constitute an assault, an act must be intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. The Court now holds that the assault alternative in section 708.1(2) is a specific-intent crime, overruling State v. Ogan, 487 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Iowa 1993), and all other cases that hold otherwise. 

State v. Owens, 635 N.W.2d 478 (Iowa 10/10/2001). [1] Ineffective assistance:  failure to sever.  Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a motion to sever trial on felon in possession of a firearm charges from trial on the drug charges.  Defendant did not meet the necessary showing of prejudice to require severance, in balancing his right to a fair trial with the State's interest in judicial efficiency.  [2]  Ineffective assistance:  failure to seek interrogatory.  Counsel was not ineffective in failing to seek a separate interrogatory regarding gun possession, without mentioning the felony status to which he had stipulated, instead of submitting the marshalling instruction and verdict form requiring a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on every element.  "When a prior conviction forms an essential element of the current charge, rather than merely furnishing the basis for an enhanced sentence, the jury must determine guilt on that element beyond a reasonable doubt; answering an interrogatory will not suffice. Even if the defendant stipulates to guilt on an element of an offense, the court must still instruct the jury as to the stipulation. To the extent State v. Smith, 576 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) holds to the contrary, we overrule it."   [3]  Incorrect drug and habitual offender sentencing:  reversed for adjustment increase.  Court should have sentenced defendant as follows:  fifteen years as an habitual offender (902.9(3) -- 15 years), subject then to being doubled by operation of enhancement for possession of weapon under 124.401(1)(e); subject then to being tripled based on prior conviction for drug tax stamp violations by operation of 124.411. 

State v. Snyder, 634 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 10/10/2001). Driving while barred -- snowmobiles.  The driving while barred statute, Iowa Code section 321.561, includes snowmobiles so as to bar the operation of a snowmobile on the public roadway while one's license is revoked under the habitual offender provisions.  

State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 629 (Iowa 10/10/2001). Warrantless stop:  anonymous tip as basis.  An anonymous tip of suspected drunk driver, (by a witness driver following the suspect's car, calling from a cell phone but not giving his or her name) based on tipster's observation that suspect was driving on the median and identifying suspect's car by license plate, make and model of car, and location of the event, provided reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant even though the stopping officers did not personally observe any behavior generating reasonable suspicion for the stop.  Unlike Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000), wherein an anonymous tip was not sufficient to justify a stop to pat down someone alleged to be carrying a gun, (1) the informant revealed the basis for his knowledge and it did not concern concealed criminal activity—he was observing a crime in progress, open to public view; (2) a serious public hazard allegedly existed that might call for a relaxed threshold of reliability; and (3) the intrusion on privacy interests is slight.    Note:  The Court held that the anonymous call came from a citizen informant, "defined as one who is a witness to or a victim of a crime."  As such, the information imparted is subject to the rebuttable presumption of being generally reliable.