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FEBRUARY 14, 2001 |
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IOWA SUPREME COURT |
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State
v. Button,
622 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 2/14/2001) Harassment:
proof of intent when defendant is accused of harassing his arresting
officer.
Substantial evidence of defendant’s intent to threaten, intimidate
or alarm an arresting officer existed by virtue of:
(1) defendant’s statement that he would have “blown [the officer’s]
brains out” if they were pheasant hunting, (2) a threat to “shoot [the
officer]” if defendant was placed in his car, and (3) derogatory remarks about
defendant’s sons. Fact that
defendant was in handcuffs during some of this time does not negate their
meaning. Harassment:
purposeful contact: contacted
not initiated by defendant. Although the victim/police officer initially made contact with
defendant, defendant’s subsequent behavior turned the encounter into his own
“purposeful acts” constituting harassment, including threats and
uncooperativeness. Harassment:
freedom of speech claim rejected.
Statutes that punish speech amounting to “true threats”
(determined by totality of the circumstances) are not unconstitutional.
State
v. Daly,
623 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 2/14/2001). [1]
No
waiver of adverse pretrial ruling by presenting it on direct. Defendant
does not waive his or her right to object to the court’s admission of Rule 609
impeachment evidence by bringing it up during his own direct examination after
having lost a pretrial motion to exclude the evidence from trial. [2] Relevance:
court abuses discretion by failing to balance the probative value against
the likely unfair prejudicial effect. “In determining whether the probative value of evidence of a prior
conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect, the trial court should consider
such factors as: (1) the nature of the conviction; (2) the conviction’s bearing
on veracity; (3) the age of the conviction, and (4) its tendency to improperly
influence the jury.”
State
v. DeCamp ,
622 N.W.2d 290 (Iowa 2/14/2001).
[1]
Drug sentencing enhancements: what is meant by prior
violations of “this section”.
Defendant’s prior possession of controlled substance convictions under former Iowa statutes not
bearing the same section numbers as the present one were valid predicate
offenses notwithstanding the enhancing statute’s reference to prior violations
of “this subsection”. [2] Prospectivity
of enhancement statutes. Recidivism laws do
not define a new offense or add elements to existing crimes, nor do they punish
for an old offense. They merely
enhance the punishment for a current offense.
Whether a new statute using old offenses to enhance a current crime
applies in a given situation depends on whether the current offense occurred
after the date the enhancing statute became effective.
The relevant “retrospective vs. prospective application” question is
not when the priors occurred, but whether the legislature intended to include
them in the enhancement scheme. Prior
possession of controlled substance convictions are intended to be used to enhance subsequently-occurring
possession of controlled substance convictions.
State
v. Houts,
622 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 2/14/2001).
Failure
to appear: while awaiting sentence
or pending appeal after conviction. Defendant who pled guilty but then failed to appear either his
bond review hearing or for sentencing was properly chargeable with two counts of
failure to appear under section 811.2(8) (1999). A guilty plea is a
"conviction" for purposes of this statute; the legislature intended to
punish as a felony a failure to appear while awaiting sentence on any charge
(felony or misdemeanor).
State
v. Kirby,
622 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 2/14/2001).
Probation
revocation: due process
requirements. Although probation revocation proceedings can be informal and even
summary, revocation involves a serious loss of liberty requiring the provision
of due process. Specifically, the
fact finder must provide a written statement, regarding the evidence relied on
and reasons for the revocation, or its functional equivalent:
an oral statement of such findings on the record, made in defendant’s
presence in open court. Probation:
compliance with the law a condition. Whether or not expressed in the probation instructions, a fundamental
condition of any probation is that the probationer shall not violate the law.
Burden of proof
– revocation proceedings. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in revocation
proceedings; the requisite degree of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Failure
to give reasons for selecting particular sentence instead of another.
The district court does
not have to elaborate on its reasons for rejecting alternative forms of
punishment; instead, there must be compliance with R. Cr. P. 22’s requirement
of a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.
State
v. Lumadue,
622 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 2/14/2001) [1]
Sentencing: allocution denied.
Defendant did not validly waive the right of allocution by the following
phrase contained in his written stipulation to a bench trial:
“I waive personal conversation with the Court concerning this
charge.” Whatever was meant by
the phrase in the context of a jury trial waiver, it had no bearing on
post-trial sentencing proceedings including allocution.
[2] Sentencing:
reasons for sentence not given.
Neither the transcript nor the following boilerplate written language
“[t]he Court has determined that this sentence will provide reasonable
protection of the public. Probation is denied because it is unwarranted” satisfied R.
Cr. P. 22(3)(d) requirement that the court state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.
State
v. McDowell,
622 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 2001) (2/14/2001)
[1] Possession
of firearm enhancement element of drug charge:
constructive possession. When one’s constructive possession of a weapon is based on joint
possession of the premises on which the weapon is found, the state must
demonstrate defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the item.
Knowledge can be demonstrated as actual knowledge or by incriminating
circumstantial evidence. Where no
such evidence is present and defense counsel did not move to set aside the
jury’s finding on that count, counsel was ineffective and defendant must be
resentenced so as to exclude the accompanying enhancement.
[2] Judges should
instruct on knowledge element. District courts are admonished to include the element of knowledge of
the (enhancement) firearm’s existence and location, in instructions defining
immediate possession or control of a firearm.
State
v. Talbert,
622 N.W.2d 297 (Iowa 2/14/2001).
[1] Proof
of prior out-of-state conviction: insufficient.
State’s proof of defendant’s prior OWI offense in Tennessee
failed when the only proof was a docket entry that did not identify the offense
by code section, along with a photocopy of the Tennessee Code Annotated’s OWI
offense, section 55-10-401. [2] Preservation
of error by State. Where state appeals a lower court’s adverse ruling, it
cannot raise issues not raised below. [3]
Burden
of proof: OWI priors, for
enhancement purposes. “[T]he
state must prove OWI convictions for enhanced OWI purposes beyond a reasonable
doubt before the court can impose the enhanced penalties.”
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Last
updated:
March 11, 2005
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