FEBRUARY 14, 2001

IOWA SUPREME COURT


State v. Button, 622  N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 2/14/2001) Harassment:  proof of intent when defendant is accused of harassing his arresting officer.  Substantial evidence of defendant’s intent to threaten, intimidate or alarm an arresting officer existed by virtue of:  (1) defendant’s statement that he would have “blown [the officer’s] brains out” if they were pheasant hunting, (2) a threat to “shoot [the officer]” if defendant was placed in his car, and (3) derogatory remarks about defendant’s sons.  Fact that defendant was in handcuffs during some of this time does not negate their meaning.  Harassment:  purposeful contact:  contacted not initiated by defendant. Although the victim/police officer initially made contact with defendant, defendant’s subsequent behavior turned the encounter into his own “purposeful acts” constituting harassment, including threats and uncooperativeness.  Harassment:  freedom of speech claim rejected.  Statutes that punish speech amounting to “true threats” (determined by totality of the circumstances) are not unconstitutional.   

State v. Daly, 623 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 2/14/2001). [1] No waiver of adverse pretrial ruling by presenting it on direct. Defendant does not waive his or her right to object to the court’s admission of Rule 609 impeachment evidence by bringing it up during his own direct examination after having lost a pretrial motion to exclude the evidence from trial.  [2] Relevance:  court abuses discretion by failing to balance the probative value against the likely unfair prejudicial effect. “In determining whether the probative value of evidence of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect, the trial court should consider such factors as:  (1)  the nature of the conviction; (2) the conviction’s bearing on veracity; (3) the age of the conviction, and (4) its tendency to improperly influence the jury.” 

State v. DeCamp, 622 N.W.2d 290 (Iowa 2/14/2001).  [1] Drug sentencing enhancements:  what is meant by prior violations of “this section”.  Defendant’s prior possession of controlled substance convictions under former Iowa statutes not bearing the same section numbers as the present one were valid predicate offenses notwithstanding the enhancing statute’s reference to prior violations of “this subsection”.  [2]  Prospectivity of enhancement statutes.  Recidivism laws do not define a new offense or add elements to existing crimes, nor do they punish for an old offense.  They merely enhance the punishment for a current offense.  Whether a new statute using old offenses to enhance a current crime applies in a given situation depends on whether the current offense occurred after the date the enhancing statute became effective.  The relevant “retrospective vs. prospective application” question is not when the priors occurred, but whether the legislature intended to include them in the enhancement scheme.  Prior possession of controlled substance convictions are intended to be used to enhance subsequently-occurring possession of controlled substance convictions.

State v. Houts, 622 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 2/14/2001). Failure to appear:  while awaiting sentence or pending appeal after conviction. Defendant who pled guilty but then failed to appear either his bond review hearing or for sentencing was properly chargeable with two counts of failure to appear under section 811.2(8) (1999). A guilty plea is a "conviction" for purposes of this statute; the legislature intended to punish as a felony a failure to appear while awaiting sentence on any charge (felony or misdemeanor). 

State v. Kirby, 622 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 2/14/2001). Probation revocation:  due process requirements. Although probation revocation proceedings can be informal and even summary, revocation involves a serious loss of liberty requiring the provision of due process.  Specifically, the fact finder must provide a written statement, regarding the evidence relied on and reasons for the revocation, or its functional equivalent:  an oral statement of such findings on the record, made in defendant’s presence in open court.  Probation:  compliance with the law a condition. Whether or not expressed in the probation instructions, a fundamental condition of any probation is that the probationer shall not violate the law.  Burden of proof – revocation proceedings. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in revocation proceedings; the requisite degree of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.  Failure to give reasons for selecting particular sentence instead of another. The district court does not have to elaborate on its reasons for rejecting alternative forms of punishment; instead, there must be compliance with R. Cr. P. 22’s requirement of a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.   

State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 2/14/2001) [1] Sentencing:  allocution denied.   Defendant did not validly waive the right of allocution by the following phrase contained in his written stipulation to a bench trial:  “I waive personal conversation with the Court concerning this charge.”  Whatever was meant by the phrase in the context of a jury trial waiver, it had no bearing on post-trial sentencing proceedings including allocution.  [2] Sentencing:  reasons for sentence not given.  Neither the transcript nor the following boilerplate written language “[t]he Court has determined that this sentence will provide reasonable protection of the public.  Probation is denied because it is unwarranted” satisfied R. Cr. P. 22(3)(d) requirement that the court state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.   

State v. McDowell, 622 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 2001) (2/14/2001) [1] Possession  of firearm enhancement element of drug charge:  constructive possession. When one’s constructive possession of a weapon is based on joint possession of the premises on which the weapon is found, the state must demonstrate defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the item.  Knowledge can be demonstrated as actual knowledge or by incriminating circumstantial evidence.  Where no such evidence is present and defense counsel did not move to set aside the jury’s finding on that count, counsel was ineffective and defendant must be resentenced so as to exclude the accompanying enhancement.  [2] Judges should instruct on knowledge element.  District courts are admonished to include the element of knowledge of the (enhancement) firearm’s existence and location, in instructions defining immediate possession or control of a firearm.   

State v. Talbert, 622 N.W.2d 297 (Iowa 2/14/2001). [1] Proof of prior out-of-state conviction:  insufficient.  State’s proof of defendant’s prior OWI offense in Tennessee failed when the only proof was a docket entry that did not identify the offense by code section, along with a photocopy of the Tennessee Code Annotated’s OWI offense, section 55-10-401.  [2] Preservation of error by State.  Where state appeals a lower court’s adverse ruling, it cannot raise issues not raised below.  [3] Burden of proof:  OWI priors, for enhancement purposes.  “[T]he state must prove OWI convictions for enhanced OWI purposes beyond a reasonable doubt before the court can impose the enhanced penalties.”  


Last updated:
March 11, 2005


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