In re Property Seized from Terrell, 639 N.W.2d 18 (Iowa 1/24/2002).  [1]  Forfeiture of item based on acts committed as a juvenile. Petitioner's conduct, even though prosecuted in juvenile court, was an act or omission which is a public offense covered by Iowa Code section 809A.3 (1997) and was therefore a proper basis for forfeiture.  [2]  Forfeiture:  disproportionality analysis.  The comparison in a disproportionality analysis must be made between the value of the property to be forfeited and the severity of the offense as viewed by the legislature, not the actual sanction imposed.  

Maghee v. State/Munz v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Jones County, 639 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 1/24/2002).   Postconviction attack on disciplinary proceedings: no right to court-appointed counsel. No state or federal constitutional right to counsel exists for a postconviction petitioner challenging disciplinary actions.  Petitioners' equal-protection argument also fails under both state and federal constitutions because they fail to identify any disparate treatment that impacts a class of persons to which they belong. The district court correctly determined that there was neither a statutory nor a constitutional basis for providing counsel to these postconviction applicants at state expense. Even assuming discretion to appoint counsel in some cases in which no statutory right to counsel is provided in challenges brought under section 822.2(6), the Court remains unconvinced that such a power carries with it the power to order the State to compensate counsel thus appointed.  

State v. Bullock, 638 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1/24/2002). [1] Merger: 2^nd-degree sexual abuse into 1^st-degree burglary conviction. The crime of second-degree sexual abuse does not meet the legal-elements test to properly be considered a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary because it is possible to commit first-degree burglary under the sexual-abuse alternative without also committing second-degree sexual abuse. Furthermore, the court is not at liberty to broaden the sexual abuse element of the burglary offense, which the legislature has expressly defined in a narrow manner, and the burglary statute is not susceptible to the broad interpretation of the kidnapping statutes adopted in our prior cases. [2] Sex offender registry. An incarcerated defendant's duty to register as a sex offender commences upon his release from prison, and the determination of the length of any required registration is an administrative decision initially committed to the Department of Public Safety. The sentencing court was without authority to determine the length of any future registration by the defendant. Until the Department has made a decision on the defendant's term of registration, there is no concrete controversy, and any adjudication by the district court prior to an administrative decision and a request for judicial review of that decision is premature. The nature and extent of the defendant's registration obligation are issues that are not ripe for our review.  [3] Appellate procedure -- State's appeal as matter of right. The State was not entitled to appeal as a matter of right, but the Court proceeded as though the proper form of review had been sought. The propriety of merging second-degree sexual abuse into a conviction for first-degree burglary raises a question of law important to the judiciary and profession and discretionary review is granted.

State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1/24/2002).  General sentencing statute:  no authority to suspend portion of indeterminate sentence.  The language in section 901.5(3), which authorizes a sentencing judge to suspend the execution of the sentence or any part of it, is only intended to authorize the suspension of a portion of a sentence in regard to determinate sentencing orders. No such authority exists with respect to an indeterminate sentence.

State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1/24/2002).  [1]  Sentencing:  no abuse of discretion generally.  No abuse of discretion in imposing a term of incarceration; record did not support any inference that the district court considered unproven or unprosecuted additional offenses when sentencing; no abuse of discretion in setting the terms of the original $50,000 cash appeal bond. [2]  District court jurisdiction over bail following conviction.  Iowa Code section 811.5 (1999) contemplates that bail following conviction is collateral to the merits of any issues raised on appeal from the judgment and sentence, and authorizes the district court to consider motions and applications regarding bail during the appeal. [3]  Jurisdiction to increase appeal bond during appeal.  The district court has jurisdiction to consider the State's application to review the appeal bond following defendant's appeal.  [4]  Preservation of error:  challenge to changed appeal bond.  Defendant who fails to separately appeal an additional order changing the conditions of an appeal bond fails to preserve the issue for review on the original appeal.  

State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1/24/2002). [1]  Material witness statute:  substantive due process.   Iowa's material witness statute (section 804.11) does not violate constitutional notions of substantive due process.  The government interest in securing the testimony of material witnesses for the prosecution of felony offenses is compelling, and the statute allows a magistrate to exercise discretion to provide for less restrictive alternatives to secure a witness' appearance at trial. In addition, the pre-trial detention imposed by the material witness statute does not constitute impermissible punishment without a trial. Further, section 804.11 is regulatory in nature, and the infringement imposed by the statute is not excessive in relation to the regulatory goal. To comply with substantive due process, an officer must have probable cause to believe it is reasonably likely the individual will be unavailable for trial. Incorporating this interpretation into the statute, the Court concludes the pre-trial detention of a material witness is not excessive in relation to the regulatory goal. [2]  Material witness statute:  procedural due process.  The provisions of sections 804.11 and 804.23 provide procedures to guide law enforcement personnel and judicial officers in the arrest of a material witness. These procedures must be strictly followed to prevent an abuse of the powers provided by the material witness statute. In addition, a defendant should be provided an opportunity to be heard at a later time similar to a preliminary hearing, and the defendant should be permitted to be heard on all of the relevant issues, including whether a less restrictive alternative is a viable option as well as to present evidence. While the Court prefers that an officer obtain an arrest warrant before arresting an individual as a material witness, exigent circumstances may exist where the warrant requirement would unreasonably frustrate an officer's efforts to locate a witness.  

State v. Moore, 638 N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 1/24/2002).  [1]  Written guilty pleas to felony charges again condemned.  As in State v. Hook, 623 N.W.2d 865, 869-70 (Iowa 2001), the Court stresses that a district court must literally follow the requirements of rule 8(2)(b) in taking defendant's plea to a felony charge, i.e., requiring specified personal colloquy between court and defendant. [2]  Ineffective assistance -- no per se prejudice from allowing violation of 8(2)(b) guilty plea to felony.  Court declines to adopt a per se ineffective-assistance-of- counsel rule in guilty-plea cases that would excuse defendant from filing motion in arrest of judgment where requirements of 8(2)(b) were not literally complied with in plea to felony.