JULY 17, 2002

IOWA SUPREME COURT


Hot pursuit -- warrantless entry ok

State v. Pink, N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 7/17/2002). Search and seizure – Warrantless entry of defendant’s home by officer in hot pursuit. Officer gave chase to defendant after receiving tip that defendant had been driving erratically with his bright lights on and was believed to have been drinking. Defendant did not slow down despite the officer’s use of his white sweeping light, instead pulling into his driveway and approaching his screened-in porch. Defendant failed to heed the officer’s call to stop, instead entering his home. The officer then (1) entered the porch area, (2) knocked on the door, (3) told the answering party (defendant’s girlfriend) that he needed to talk to defendant, (4) stated that he was coming in, and (5) stepped into the kitchen to wait for defendant to exit the bathroom. After twenty minutes, the officer told defendant’s girlfriend that he was going in after the defendant. The girlfriend told defendant of this statement after which defendant emerged from the bathroom. The officer noted signs of intoxication, administered sobriety tests which defendant failed, and arrested defendant. Finding no Fourth Amendment violation here, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa 2001) that a warrantless search in an attached garage (curtilage) by an officer in hot pursuit did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the officer in this case did not personally observe the illegal behavior (instead relying on a tip) at the outset did not change the outcome.

"Knowledge" element of possession not inferrable when possession of property is joint

State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 7/17/2002). [1] "Possession" -- knowledge element of "possession" where accused is not sole owner of premises on which drugs found. The "knowledge" component of "possession" may not be inferred when a defendant is merely a joint owner of property in which drugs are found. Knowledge will not be inferred unless a defendant is the sole and exclusive owner of the premises. Knowledge may be shown by proof of actual knowledge or "evidence of incriminating statements or circumstances from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge by the accused of the presence of the substances on the premises." (Overruling any holding to the contrary in State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1995) and State v. Rudd, 454 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1990). [NOTE: Where the defendant does not have exclusive control over the premises where the contraband is found, the State must marshall additional evidence connecting the defendant to the drugs. The Webb decision contains a few ideas how to establish that connection, e.g., incriminating statements by the defendant, incriminating actions by defendant upon police's discovery of the drugs, defendant's personal belongings among or near the drugs, or defendant's fingerprints on the drug packaging. Cases from other jurisdictions suggest other sources for nexus evidence, e.g., the presence of a large quantity of the substance coupled with defendant's routine access to or regular use of an area where such substances are kept, defendant being in close proximity to drugs or drug paraphernalia in plain view of the police, defendant's nervousness exhibited during search, or defendant's flight upon realizing the presence of police. See State v. Foulks, 72 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). This is not an exhaustive list. Law enforcement and prosecutors must now be more diligent in finding evidence to connect defendant to the drugs. The court should view the totality of circumstances in deciding if the State has proved that defendant exercised dominion and control over the drugs, so the more facts tying the accused to the contraband the better.] [2] Child endangerment – insufficient evidence of "custody or control". Insufficient evidence exists to support conviction of child endangerment where (1) the sole contention supporting the "custody or control" element was based on defendant’s status as the child’s babysitter, but (2) the defendant was absent from the premises so as not to have the power to restrict or govern the child when drugs were found at the apartment.

 


Last updated:
October 05, 2004


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