NOVEMBER 14, 2002

Iowa Supreme Court

In-court guilty pleas:  "substantial compliance" with requirement that defendant be advised of rights is all that is required; although standard not met here, no ineffective assistance as no prejudice.

State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 11/14/2002).  [1]  Guilty plea – ineffective assistance challenge based on counsel’s failure to object to court’s failure to advise her of right to compulsory process. Counsel breached an essential duty in failing to object to court’s failure to substantially comply with requirement that in-court defendant pleading guilty to second-degree murder had the right of compulsory process.  (The Court reiterates the holding of State v. Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 1990) that the requirement is one of substantial compliance, distinguishing this case from State v. Moore, 638 N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 202) and State v. Hook, 623 N.W.2d 865 (Iowa 2001), which hold that a written guilty plea to a felony, even when accompanied by partial questioning of the defendant, is not an adequate substitute for the full oral colloquy required by Rule 8(2)(b) for pleas to a felony.)  However, the prejudice prong is not met where, as here, defendant does not prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.  [2]  Guilty plea – ineffective assistance challenge based on counsel’s failure to assert that there was an insufficient factual basis for the crime. Sufficient evidence of malice aforethought existed for a plea to second degree murder (slammed-baby) where defendant acknowledged the truth of the minutes of testimony, which indicated from the medical examiner that the victim was “shaken, slammed and that the manner of death is homicide” and from the defendant’s pretrial statement that she shook the victim and tossed him to the floor “with a number 9 force under your scale” as well as her admissions during her in-court colloquy that she remembered shaking the child and slamming him down to the floor, very angry at the time and knowing that some physical harm would occur to him. [3]  Guilty plea – challenge based on alleged failure to understand or appreciate the legal consequences. Defendant’s challenge to guilty plea based on her assertion of diminished capacity by virtue of her ten-month incarceration and depression based on her recent abortion determined to be without merit based on the guilty-plea colloquy.  [4]  $150,000 restitution provision – Supremacy Clause challenge based on statute’s provision that restitution awards are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.  Challenge to restitution statute based on its provision that the award is not dischargeable in bankruptcy is rejected for two reasons:  first, the same argument has been rejected by the federal courts; second, because defendant failed to raise it below she is charged with demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel for that failure and cannot do so under the prejudice prong (but for counsel’s failure to raise the issue she would not have pled guilty).

Interstate Agreement on Detainers –
Reversal for Failure to Provide Speedy Trial

State v. Widmer-Baum, 653 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 11/13/2002) [1]  Interstate Agreement on Detainers – untimely trial.  A State that proceeds under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Iowa Code chapter 821) must provide trial within one of two specified time periods, depending on which section of the agreement is the basis of the action.  Once a detainer is filed, either the prisoner or the receiving state can activate further procedures to dispose of a pending charge in the receiving state, and that factor determines which time period governs.  First, the prisoner can request disposition of the charges under article III of the agreement; in which case the prisoner must be brought to trial within 180 days after written notice of that request has been delivered to the prosecutor in the appropriate court of the receiving state.  Second, the receiving state can request temporary custody under Article IV of the agreement; if return is accomplished under this method the receiving state has 120 days from the prisoner’s arrival in which to try the prisoner on the pending charges (under this method, there is no statutory provision restricting the time in which the receiving state must complete the transfer after requesting temporary custody).  Where the State essentially waives its Article IV request by proceeding in response to the prisoner’s Article III request (see [3], below), it fails to provide speedy trial when the trial is conducted more than 180 days after written notice of the prisoner’s request was received.   [2]  Interstate Agreement on Detainers – effect of detainee’s election to request disposition. Prisoner against whom a detainer is placed by another state pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers may choose to request disposition of the charges under Article III of the agreement.   That request is “considered to be a waiver of the right to contest extradition, as well as a consent to appear in any court necessary to effectuate the purposes of the IAD [Interstate Agreement on Detainers].”  [3]  Interstate Agreement on Detainers – which Article applies when procedures are instituted by both the prisoner and the receiving state.    When determining “competing or overlapping requests under article III and article IV”, the Supreme Court applies the rules that “the first party to perfect the compact request, be it the state or the prisoner, is entitled to proceed according to the article of the compact under which that request is made.”  However, the rule does not prevent the other party from instituting proceedings.  In addition, the rule “does not prevent the first perfected party from waiving its right to proceed under its request and elect to proceed under a subsequent request by the other party.”  The inquiry, then, considers not only who was first to perfect their request, but “under which article the parties proceeded following a request” (emphasis added).  The State waived its article IV request by accepting the prisoner’s offer to return under article III.   (Where Iowa was the first party to perfect a request under article IV but did not proceed until the second request – by the prisoner under article III nearly a year later – the State was proceeding under article III, not article IV.  As such, the applicable speedy trial period was 180 days after written notice of that request has been delivered to the prosecutor in the appropriate court of the receiving state, as opposed to 120 days from the prisoner’s arrival in which to try the prisoner on the pending charges from the date ).  [4]  Interstate Agreement on Detainers – remedy for failure to provide prisoner with trial within prescribed periods.  “The IAD provides that the indictment ‘shall’ be dismissed if the prisoner is not brought to trial within 180 days of the time the receiving state receives the prisoner’s IAD request, absent good cause for a continuance.”  This means that, absent continuance or waiver, such charges “must be dismissed with prejudice if a prisoner is not brought to trial within the prescribed time period.”