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Vehicular
homicide: sufficiency of
“recklessness” element
State
v. Begey,
672 N.W.2d 747 (Iowa 12/17/2003).
[1] Vehicular homicide: sufficiency
of “recklessness” element. Sufficient
evidence of recklessness existed given that defendant, in the process of
driving a car her mother offered to her if she could get it away from her
stepfather (during the pendency of divorce proceedings) drove away with
her stepfather on the hood, faster than the speed limit, increased her
speed while he was on the hood, and slammed on her brakes, causing him to
fall and hit his head, killing him. (No
ineffective assistance in failing to move for judgment of acquittal on
evidence of this element). [2]
Proximate cause – intervening and superseding must be SOLE proximate
cause to excuse defendant. Defendant’s
argument that victim’s act of leaving the hood of the moving car
defendant was driving was actually an intervening and superseding cause
was without merit: even assuming the victim’s movement reflected a
choice, it was not the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death so as
to excuse defendant from her role as a proximate cause.
[3] Recklessness instruction changed.
Court notes that present uniform instruction on recklessness (I
Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 200.20 (2002)) notes the changes wrought from State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Iowa 2001) and State
v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993) and should be used in place
of former instruction. [4]
Justification defense – error in not making offer of proof/ allowing
admission of evidence in support of.
Reversible error to instruct the jury on justification but
disallow defendant’s evidence in support thereof; namely, that she was
afraid more harm would befall at the hands of the victim, and why, by
stopping than by continuing to drive with the victim on her hood.
In-court
colloquy required for waiver of jury trial
State
v. Liddell,
672 N.W.2d 805 (Iowa 12/17/2003) [1]
Jury trial waiver – sufficiency.
Court now interprets requirements of Iowa R. Cr. P. 2.17(1)
(waiver of jury trial) to require the court to conduct an in-court
colloquy with defendants who wish to waive their jury trial rights.
(overruling State v. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 1984)
to the extent that it interpreted rule’s “on the record”
requirement as not requiring a “reported proceeding in open court.”)
The ultimate standard for the colloquy is “whether the waiver is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent”, involving an inquiry that “may
involve” (not “black-letter rules” nor a “checklist”) informing
the defendant (1) 12 members of the community compose a jury, (2) the
defendant may take part in jury selection, (3) jury verdicts must be
unanimous, (4) the court alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant
waives a jury trial, and (5) neither the court nor the prosecution will
reward the defendant for waiving a jury trial.
Substantial compliance is acceptable.
(However, counsel was not ineffective in failing to foresee
divergence that this case brings to the area).
WHAT IS REQUIRED: “[f]or
waivers taking place once this decision is final … a trial court must
conduct the proceedings ‘on the record,’ in the sense that some
in-court colloquy with the defendant is required in order to ensure the
defendant’s waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent.” [2]
Sentencing court reference to having “no choice” but to revoke
probation. Sentencing
court’s reference to having “no choice” but to revoke defendant’s
probation did not represent the failure to exercise discretion; instead it
was a reflection of the court’s understandable frustration with
defendant’s disregard for the welfare of the victim, to whom he had
repeatedly failed to make restitution.
Defendant
“in custody” for Miranda purposes when questioned in own home
State
v. Miranda,
672 N.W.2d 753 (Iowa 12/17/2003)
[1] Miranda warnings: custody.
Defendant was unlawfully
subjected to custodial interrogation while in custody in the apartment he
was renting. The custody
analysis consisted of the following:
defendant was taken from one room to another, handcuffed, and
questioned by officers who initiated the questioning. Although the
questioning was brief, occurred in the defendant’s own home, and
occurred as part of a group interrogation, the defendant was confronted
with “strong evidence of his guilt, and there is little reason to
believe the officers would not have asked more questions if Miranda had
not incriminated himself with such alacrity.” However, most importantly,
the fact that the defendant was handcuffed “strongly indicates he was
not free to leave … To hold otherwise would wrongly suggest Miranda was
free to leave while securely anchored to police property.”
Another important fact was that defendant was also not told that he
was not under arrest. [2]
Miranda warnings: interrogation
to multiple parties at once (dicta).
In their questioning, the police directed some questions to a
group, two of which were handcuffed.
As such, the police “engaged in ‘express questioning … [other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that [they] should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.’” [3]
Waiver of jury trial. Defendant
effected a valid waiver of jury trial by signing a written waiver and by
the fact that the judge conducted an extensive in-court colloquy with
defendant. Although
trial counsel “did not ensure the court met each of the five specific
exhortations of Stallings, in this case there is no question
Miranda waived a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
Thus counsel was not ineffective in reference to the jury trial
waiver.
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