JANUARY 23, 2003

IOWA SUPREME COURT

Sexually violent predator - 
instruction on requisite “mental abnormality”

In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1/23/2003)  [1]  Sexually violent predator - instruction on requisite “mental abnormality”.  “Mental abnormality” that will subject one to sexually violent predator proceedings under Iowa law means (and should be instructed on as) “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his behavior”.  

Sexually violent predator - necessary showing for currently-incarcerated subject

In re Detention of Gonzales, 658 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1/23/2003) [1] Sexually violent predator - necessary showing for currently-incarcerated subject.  Where the statutory basis for sexually violent predator proceedings (Chapter 229A -- which sets out slightly different language for incarcerated versus non-incarcerated subjects) is the subject’s current incarcerated status, the Iowa Supreme Court requires that the conviction underlying the incarceration be a sexually violent offense.  As such, where the petitioner was not confined for a sexually violent offense and the State failed to prove or even allege a recent overt act, reversal and remand for dismissal followed. 

Preaccusatorial delay – standards merged; 
no actual prejudice found

State v. Brown, 656 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1/23/2003).  [1]  Preservation of error - stipulated trial on the minutes.  At his stipulated bench trial on the minutes, defendant did not renew his objection to the admission of testimony the admission of which was unsuccessfully challenged before trial.  The rule is that a stipulation to the admission of testimony will normally waive any pretrial objection to its admission.  However, the Court held the “spirit” of the preservation of error doctrine was met by the following facts:  defendant did not affirmatively and specifically consent to the admission of the witness’s testimony and the record revealed that the parties and the court understood that the pretrial objection and ruling would be sufficient to preserve the issue at the stipulated trial.  At that trial, the district court advised that it intended to consider the subject testimony but that defendant was not waiving his “right to argue” on appeal that it should have been excluded.   [2]  Hearsay and confrontation objections not equated with each other.  Court explains differences between hearsay and confrontation rules:  admission of hearsay is reviewed on appeal for errors at law, whereas Confrontation Clause issues are reviewed de no.  Prejudice analysis for hearsay violations is “where substantially the same evidence is in the record, erroneously admitted evidence will not be considered prejudicial.”  Prejudice analysis for confrontation violation is that “the State must establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Here, prejudice (assuming that third-party’s rendition of accomplice admission was improperly ruled admissible and relied upon) was not demonstrated.  Substantially the same evidence was in the record (for hearsay analysis).  Additionally, the substantially similar testimony as well as other evidence in the record demonstrated that the admission of the subject testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (for Confrontation analysis).  [3]  Preaccusatorial delay.  Although it is possible for the State to work a denial of a defendant’s due process rights by delaying the filing of charges to intentionally gain a tactical advantage over the accused, this defendant (charged 24 years after the crime) did not meet his heavy burden to prove a due process violation by virtue of the required dual factors of: (1) actual prejudice to defendant’s defense due to delay (dispositive here because only generalized claims of prejudice were made) and (2) unreasonable delay.  Actual prejudice must be supported by a showing that the loss of evidence or testimony has meaningfully impaired the ability to present a defense.  Generalized claims of “loss of memory, loss of witnesses, or loss of evidence” do not constitute actual prejudice. [4]  Failure to preserve claim of ineffective assistance for postconviction.  Defendant failed to preserve ineffective assistance of counsel claim by raising issue on appeal without adequate explanation of the charges. 

Waiver of jury trial - counsel found ineffective 
in representation on  

State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d. 106 (Iowa 1/23/2003) [1]  Requirements for valid waiver of jury trial.  Trial counsel found ineffective in failing to obtain client’s waiver of jury trial in writing and secure the court’s compliance with the rule governing waivers of jury trial.  Court reads rule 2.17(1) (dealing with waiver of jury trial) to require court involvement in the waiver process.  Neither a written waiver nor an in-court colloquy is constitutionally required to establish a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, but “practical considerations suggest that a written waiver as well as an in-court colloquy should be used to assure a proper waiver.”  [2] What the district court should inform defendant of, in assessing waiver.  The court gives specific guidance about what the court should inform the defendant about in assessing a waiver, regarding the defendant’s understanding of the difference between jury and nonjury trials:  (1) twelve members of the community compose a jury, (2) the defendant may take part in jury selection, (3) jury verdicts must be unanimous, and (4) the court alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial. [3] Prejudice presumed.  “Because the right to a jury trial is so fundamental to our justice system, we conclude this is one of those rare cases of a ‘structural’ defect in which prejudice is presumed.”

Waiver of counsel during prior guilty pleas -- sufficiency for use of convictions in subsequent proceedings