Cash-only bail not unconstitutional

State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 7/16/2003). [1] Appeal – justiciability of issue vs. mootness. Court will consider an issue even though it is moot by the time of appeal, depending on the following criteria: (1) the private or public nature of the issue; (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication to guide public officials in their future conduct; (3) the likelihood of the recurrence of the issue; and (4) the likelihood the issue will recur yet evade appellate review. [2] Bail – Iowa constitutionality of requiring cash bail. “Iowa Code section 811.2 permits a district court to set cash only bail if such bail will best guarantee the accused’s further presence for necessary judicial proceedings… [so] we conclude that this is permissible under the sufficient sureties clause of the Iowa Constitution so long as the accused is permitted access to a surety in some form.”

Insufficient evidence of constructive possession (drugs) found

State v. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 7/16/2003). Drugs – constructive possession – evidence insufficient. Constructive possession is “knowledge of the presence of the controlled substances on the premises and the ability to maintain control over them.” If a defendant does not have exclusive possession of the premises in which drugs are found, (as in this case, wherein defendant was one of four backseat passengers in a car, seated near the location where drugs were found), the State is required to show defendant’s actual knowledge of the drugs and his or her authority or right to maintain control of them. Proximity to the drugs, under this scenario, is not sufficient to show control and dominion.

Insufficient evidence of “dangerousness” to continue to hold defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity

State v. Huss, 666 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 7/16/2003) Involuntary commitment after “not guilty by reason of insanity verdict” – requirements. The presumption of insanity that accompanies a verdict of acquittal on that ground ends when the director of a medical facility notifies penal authorities that the defendant’s sanity has been restored. Once the report shows that the defendant is no longer mentally ill and dangerous, the burden shifts to the State to prove the contrary, (Iowa R. Cr. P. 2.22(8)(e)) – that the patient is both (1) mentally ill and (2) dangerous. The burden of proof on the State is by “clear and convincing evidence”, meaning that the evidence must leave “no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusion drawn from it. Applying these standards to the subject case, the Court found that the defendant, whose mental illness was in remission, was still mentally ill. However, it found the State’s evidence of dangerousness lacking. Such evidence “requires that the threat the patient poses to himself or others be evidenced by a ‘recent overt act, attempt or threat.’” Proof of dangerousness requires “predictive judgment based on past conduct but must be ultimately grounded on future, not past, danger.” Absent such a showing, the defendant was entitled to discharge.

Warrantless search of school locker found constitutional

State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142 (Iowa 7/16/2003). Warrantless search – school locker. The “easing of restrictions” applied to determine the constitutionality of warrantless searches conducted in schools requires the consideration of three factors: (1) the nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the search, (2) the character of the intrusion imposed by the search policy, and (3) the nature and immediacy of the school’s concerns and the efficacy of the search policy in meeting them. Here, Supreme Court concludes (1) defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his locker, (2) the character of the search was not overly intrusive – done by school officials without defendant present, but conducted a day after defendant failed to participate in an all-school locker cleanout that was supervised by a teacher, and (3) “[g]iven the public school context in which this controversy arose and the present realities of public education, we conclude that the search conducted by school officials was proper.”

Prior “accommodation” offense was a delivery offense
for purposes of 124.401(5) recidivism statute

State v. Rankin, 666 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 7/16/2003). Drugs – recidivist possession of marijuana. Defendant was not entitled to application of section 124.401(5) “serious misdemeanor” recidivist provision for his conviction of marijuana possession arising from an event only two days after he was convicted of possession with intent to deliver marijuana found to be an accommodation offense under 124.410 for which he was then sentenced. The fact that the prior offense was an accommodation offense did not convert it to a mere “possession” crime, which would have allowed the second (subject) offense to have been punished as a serious misdemeanor (instead of the aggravated misdemeanor offense when the prior crime is by “delivery” or “possession with intent to deliver”). Instead, the prior [accommodation] offense was considered a delivery offense, so that the recidivist provisions applicable when the second offense was committed amounted to an aggravated misdemeanor: “[b]ecause [defendant] was convicted of an accommodation offense in violation of section 124.410 and not a possession-of-marijuana offense, his previous conviction does not fall within the ‘this subsection’ language of paragraph two of section 124.401(5)” [which would constitute a serious, not an aggravated, misdemeanor].”

Meaning of “personal contact” for harassment

State v. Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa 7/16/2003). [1] Harassment and tampering with a juror – personal contact requirement. For the “personal contact” requirement to be met, it is not necessary that the victim recognize the offender or know the identity of the person harassing him or her, nor does it require that the victim actually feel threatened, intimidated, or alarmed: only that the defendant act with the intent to cause such a reaction. Defendant’s apparent “trailing” of victim – a former juror in a case deciding defendant’s guilt – in an SUV with tinted windows, as well as his approach of her in a store, constituted sufficient evidence of “personal contact”. [2] Waiver of right to testify – court not required to determine knowing and voluntary relinquishment of right. Supreme Court reiterates its holding in Schertz v. State, 380 N.W.2d 404, 415 (Iowa 1985), that “the trial court has no duty to determine on the record that the defendant has made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to testify at trial.” (Court does reserve the question whether such a colloquy would be necessary in other circumstances, such as where there is apparent disagreement between defendant and his attorney over whether the testify). [3] Hearsay – state of mind testimony. Victim’s testimony that defendant’s conduct alarmed her was properly admitted as probative of whether her reaction was a natural consequence of defendant’s conduct, in turn bearing on whether defendant should have expected such a result, which in turn is probative of the element that he intended to alarm the victim.

Last updated:
October 05, 2004

CAVEAT: The information on this web site does not constitute legal advice. It is intended to provide general reference material and should not serve as a substitute for independent legal research and the exercise of sound prosecutorial judgment. Unless specifically designated otherwise, nothing on this site constitutes an opinion of the Iowa Attorney General, the Iowa Department of Justice, or the Iowa County Attorneys Association. Opinions on this site are slip opinions only and are subject to change before publication in the Northwest Reporter.

* -- Requires Adobe Acrobat Reader, obtainable at www.adobe.com