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Theft –
“possession or control” element
State
v. Donaldson,
663 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 2003) (6/11/2003).
Defendant “possessed or controlled” the van in
question when he (1) broke into it, (2) dismantled the steering column,
and (3) manipulated the ignition switch, turning on the radio and lighting
the “check engine” sign on the dashboard. (“Iowa, like many other
states following the Model Penal Code, has abandoned the common law
asportation [“carrying away”] requirement.”)
“Control” is deemed to begin when the defendant “use[s] the
object in a manner beyond his authority”.
“Possession” means that the defendant secured dominion over the
object. As such,
“possession or control” occurs – and a theft is completed –
“when [as here] the actor secures dominion over the object or uses it in
a manner beyond his authority.”
Impeachment
of hearsay declarant
State
v. Jordan,
663 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 2003) (6/11/2003).
Hearsay – impeachment of hearsay declarant permitted.
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.806 “essentially permits impeachment
of a hearsay declarant, whose hearsay is admitted at trial, by any method
of impeachment available to impeach a witness.”
Generally, the latter “means evidence of prior statements,
character and conduct, and impeachable prior convictions may be used.”
(District court did not err in permitting State to attempt to impeach
defendant through cross-examination of a witness about defendant’s
criminal history after she testified to a hearsay statement by defendant,
denying the infraction at issue).
Reversal
based on erroneous admission of defendant’s statements
State
v. Peterson,
663 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 2003) (6/11/2003)
[1] Miranda –
custody – person already detained. Prisoner
who was questioned by police regarding a murder for which he was not then
imprisoned was deemed to be “in custody” so as to have required
Miranda warning, as there was “added restriction on the inmate’s
freedom of movement stemming from the interrogation itself” – he was
escorted to the interrogation room separate from the general prison
population, the door was shut and guarded from the outside, the officer
told defendant about the murder investigation to solicit information from
defendant, when defendant stood at one point he was told to sit down, and
the officer testified that defendant could not have voluntarily left the
room. [2]
In-custody interrogation after invocation of rights.
Where in-custody (and charged) defendant eventually invoked his
right to remain silent, and detectives subsequently initiated
interrogation thereafter without the presence of an attorney,
defendant’s 5th, 6th, and 14th
Amendment rights were violated in the statements that resulted at the jail
and in the officer’s vehicle on the way back to Waterloo. [3] Sixth Amendment right to counsel – attachment.
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the time of
defendant’s interrogation by virtue of the facts that the State had
charged defendant with first-degree murder and a warrant for defendant had
been issued. [4] Erroneous admission of defendant’s statements (in
violation of Miranda and 6th Amendment right to counsel) not
harmless error. To
determine whether illegally-obtained statements are admissible under the
“harmless error” rule, the State must “prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained”. This in turn
requires consideration of two factors:
“The first step requires us to ask what evidence the jury
actually considered in reaching its verdict.”
“The second step requires us to weigh the probative force of that
evidence against the probative force of the erroneously admitted evidence
standing alone” Applied
here, defendant’s erroneously-admitted statements were not “so
unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered” (with
particular emphasis on the fact that the resulting evidence relied heavily
on accomplice testimony that the court found inadequately corroborated
absent defendant’s erroneously-admitted statements) as to result in “no
reasonable possibility they contributed to” defendant’s
conviction. Therefore, the
erroneous admission was not constitutionally harmless.
Late disclosure of
evidence did not require new trial
State
v. Piper,
663 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa 2003) (6/11/2003)
[1] Motion for
mistrial -- State’s late disclosure of evidence. No abuse of discretion in refusing to grant mistrial when
State produced additional information for the first time during trial (the
“sound” component to a crime scene videotape, additional footage from
the videotape showing a procedure that was known to defense counsel, 270
questionnaires of people in the area of the crime scene only two of which
bore upon the defense and both of which were either cumulative or
recanted; and 54 witness statements).
Mistrial was not required because:
(1) in context, the withheld evidence was “not that important”;
(2) the court allowed additional discovery and granted recesses to allow
defense counsel adequate time for preparation, and (3) the impartiality of
the verdict was not at risk as a result of juror stress allegedly
resulting from the activities accompanying the late disclosure.
[2] Motion
for dismissal “in the furtherance of justice” – State’s late
disclosure of evidence. Balancing
the respective rights and interests of the parties, no abuse of discretion
resulted from trial court’s refusal to dismiss a case “in the
furtherance of justice” [Iowa
R. Cr. P. 2.33(1)] based on the late production of evidence by the
prosecutor. [3] Brady
(due process) violation not found – State’s late disclosure of
evidence. Neither
“suppression” nor “materiality” existed so as to prove a due
process (Brady) violation by the State’s late production of evidence.
First, defendant either knew of the existence of the essential
facts or was otherwise able to take advantage of the “new evidence” at
trial so that the evidence was not considered suppressed.
Second, there
was no reasonable probability that disclosure would have changed the
result. [4] 404(b)
evidence of defendant’s extramarital affair properly admitted.
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that
defendant had an extramarital affair with a neighbor.
In this context, the evidence tended to demonstrate a consciousness
of guilt, it was necessary to put other evidence in context, and tended to
undermine the reliability of the alibi testimony.
Additionally, the probative value of the evidence outweighed any
unfair prejudice, particularly given that the defense depended in part on
the fact that defendant had engaged in a different extramarital affair.
[5] Chain of custody. State accounted for the continuous custody of challenged
evidence and eliminated any reasonable probability of tampering. [6]
Juror misconduct. Mere
reception of information outside the record by juror does not require
relief. Here, juror learned
that she shared a hairdresser with one of the prosecutors and the
hairdresser related that the prosecutor was married to an attorney and had
a two-year-old child. Neither
the shared relationship (same hairdresser) nor the information imparted to
the juror by the hairdresser were significant enough to satisfy the
“reasonable probability that the misconduct did in fact influence the
jury in its deliberations” requirement for a valid jury misconduct
claim. [7] Verdict –
coercion based on length of deliberation after “hung jury” note
received. Jury’s continued deliberation and rendering of verdict
ten hours after delivering message to the court (after 3 full days and two
half days of initial deliberation) was not indicative of a coerced
verdict, given (1) propriety of supplemental instruction following receipt
of jury note, (2) complexity and seriousness of trial; (3) occurrence of
holiday weekend and two 2-day weekends breaking up deliberations. [8]
Alleged instructional error. No
error in instructing jury (1) on first-degree murder by commission of
forcible felony of sexual abuse (Supreme Court found sufficient evidence
of latter) (2) that jury had nothing to do with punishment; (3) on the
“guilty” alternative before the “not guilty” option on the verdict
form; (4) that the jury could give less weight to evidence that was
subject to chain of custody objection (that determination is for the
judge, not the jury) (5) (in this case, in NOT instructing the jury) that
the State was responsible for the delays in the trial (6) (in this case as
well, in NOT instructing the jury) that knowledge on the part of the
police within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction is attributed to the
prosecutor’s office, as not relevant to any issue in the case.
[9] $150,000
restitution order on 1993 murder violates Ex Post Facto Clause.
The court’s order of restitution violated the Ex Post Facto
Clauses of the United States and Iowa constitutions, as the murder
occurred in 1993 and the relevant statute came into existence in 1997.
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