Making license
revocations retroactive and concurrent: not permissible
Iowa
Dep’t of Transp. v. Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
670 N.W.2d 814 (Iowa 10/8/2003). The
district court acted illegally in running a six-year driver’s
license revocation for OWI concurrently with a prior revocation for
refusing a chemical test, effectively shortening the revocation for
the former by 9 months. The
statute regarding revocation upon plea or guilty verdict to OWI 3rd
does not clearly prohibit retroactive dating of the six-year ban.
However, by retroactively permitting the section 321J.4 and
321J.6 revocations to start at the same time, this court impermissibly
“credited” defendant’s prior administrative revocation toward
his six-year revocation. The
fact that the court’s actions were pursuant to an alleged plea
bargain does not change the result, as the DOT is not bound by
agreements between defendants and county attorneys.
Constructive
possession: "authority or right to maintain control"
of substance means proprietary interest or immediate right to control
or reduce to possession
State
v. Bash,
670 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 10/8/2003)
Possession of a controlled substance – constructive
possession. Demonstration
of constructive possession of drugs found on premises shared by
defendant and another depend on proof of
defendant’s (1) knowledge of the drug’s presence and (2)
authority or right to maintain control of it.
Proof of joint control over the premises is not enough.
“[T]he authority or right to maintain control includes
something more than ‘raw physical ability’ to exercise control
over the controlled substance. The defendant must have some proprietary interest or an
immediate right to control or reduce the controlled substance to the
defendant’s possession.” Here,
defendant’s “authority or right to maintain control” of
substance found in a box on the nightstand of defendant’s
husband’s side of the bed was not supported by sufficient evidence.
Proof of dominion and control “could include incriminating
statements made by the defendant, incriminating actions of the
defendant upon the police’s discovery of the controlled substance
among or near the defendant’s personal belongings, the defendant’s
fingerprints on the packages containing the controlled substance, and
any other circumstances linking the defendant to the controlled
substance.”
"Public
place": front steps and common hallway of apartment
building are public places for purposes of public intox, open container
laws
State
v. Booth,
670 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 10/8/2003)
Public intoxication. The
front steps and common hallway of an apartment house are public places
for purposes of the public intoxication and (Iowa City’s) open
container laws. Distinguishing State v. Lake, 476 N.W.2d 55
(Iowa 1991) (defendant not in a public place for purposes of public
intox statute while sitting in another’s vehicle that was in a
public place) in part on the basis of the longstanding private nature
accorded vehicles, and basing its conclusion additionally on statutory
construction of the legislative intent behind the public intox
statute.
Burglary:
defense counsel not ineffective in failing to challenge
"gestational" status of longstanding law that vehicles are
occupied structures
State
v. Davis,
671 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 10/8/2003) Burglary
– occupied structure.
Counsel
was not ineffective in failing to argue that a vehicle was not an
occupied structure for purposes of burglary.
Defendant stabbed the victim through an open window of the
victim’s car in which he was sitting.
The view that a vehicle is not an occupied structure had been
rejected by the Iowa Supreme Court for almost twenty years and counsel
was not ineffective in failing to foresee what might be called a
“gestational stage” on this issue after defendant was tried
(referring to its 3-3 decision in State v. Keopasaeuth, 745
N.W.2d 637 (Iowa 2002) and arguably signaling amenability to a change in the
existing law).
Sufficient
evidence of intent element of harassment given common inferences to be
deduced from defendant's unusual behavior
State
v. Evans,
672 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 10/8/2003) [1]
Harassment – sufficient evidence.
Sufficient evidence of “intent to threaten, intimidate or
alarm the subject of the contact” existed from the following:
defendant addressed a woman to ask about her shoes, asked her
to remove one and then attempted to take hold of her foot, after which
she put her shoe back on and entered her car, while defendant
commented that her feet were beautiful and that he just wanted to look
at them. Because intent
can be inferred from the normal consequences of one’s actions, it
was reasonable for the jury to find intent because “[i]t should not
have been unexpected on defendant’s part that his conduct would
alarm the subject of his contact.”
[2] First
Amendment. Defendant’s
status as a claimed “published photographer of women’s feet” did
not give rise to a valid First Amendment right to accomplish that
objective in a manner intended to threaten, intimidate, or alarm the
subject. Valid First
Amendment claims should be obviated by the requirement that the
harassment statute criminalizes communications that are “without
legitimate purpose”; the only “legitimate purpose” that will
avoid criminal liability in this context would be a legitimate purpose
to threaten, intimidate, or alarm, a claim not made. [3]
Consecutive sentences.
Sufficient reasons for imposing incarceration and for ordering
consecutive sentences given.
[1]
Guilty plea challenge: not untimely as dating back to imposition
of sentence after defendant was expelled from drug court proceedings;
[2] standards for valid waiver of appeal; [3] Inadequate guilty plea
colloquy
State
v. Loye,
670 N.W.2d 141 (Iowa 10/8/2003)
[1] Appeals – timeliness of guilty plea appeal after
defendant expelled from drug court. Defendant
who was referred to drug court as a result of her guilty plea was
deemed to have been given a deferred judgment at that time, not a
“sentence”. As such,
her appeal of the guilty plea after being expelled from the drug court
program was timely even though not within 30 days of referral to drug
court because the “documentation of the June and
August court proceedings” revealed that sentence was
not entered until August. [2]
Waiver of right to appeal. Defendant
can waive the right to appeal, but it must be a voluntary, knowing and
intelligent waiver. The
State bears the burden to prove such a waiver.
Guilty plea court’s reference to waiver of appeal during
colloquy, without proof that it was part of the plea bargain, did not
establish waiver. First,
the plea agreement was not made part of the record and remand was not
allowed for this purpose. Second,
even if produced, it would not alone have been sufficient to prove
waiver absent some additional showing that any such waiver was
voluntary, knowing and intelligent.”
Third, the guilty plea court’s reference to the waiver of
appeal was inadequate because the court made no inquiry as to whether the defendant
knew she had the right to appeal, whether she voluntarily waived that
right, and whether she knew the consequences of giving up that
right.” [3]
Failure to file motion in arrest.
Defendant’s failure to file a motion in arrest of
judgment to challenge her guilty plea was excused by trial court’s
inadequate explanation of the nature and need of doing so, according
to which defendant’s response did not manifest a knowing and
intelligent waiver of her right to challenge the guilty plea within 45
days. [4] Inadequate
colloquy re: nature of
charges and potential punishments.
District court’s references to charges and potential
punishments fell short of the guilty plea colloquy requirements
because “it did not confirm that the defendant knew and understood
the nature of the charges to which she intended to plead guilty or the
maximum possible punishments that might result from her plea.”
Search
pursuant to challenged warrant valid as conducted pursuant to search
warrant except pertaining to vehicles (exigent circumstances &
probably cause)
State
v. Maddox,
670 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 10/8/2003) Warrantless
search – “exigency and probable cause” exception to search
warrant requirement – vehicles.
Overturning both the Court of Appeals and the district court,
the Supreme Court finds probable cause for a warrantless search (and
automatic exigency from the fact that a vehicle was the repository)
from the fact that defendant and his friend were “in possession of
several legal materials that, taken in combination, gave both [Target]
store employees and trained police officers good reason to believe
they would be used to make methamphetamine”, defendant’s responses
to investigative questions were not consistent with the circumstances
of the case, and both defendant and his cohort displayed “unusual
behavior” that strengthened the inference that the purchases were
not for innocent purposes but that criminal activity or evidence would
be found in the vehicle. (see
case for specific but rather lengthy rendition of the facts underlying
these characterizations).
New
trial based on finding that jury verdict was against the weight of the
evidence upheld as not constituting abuse of trial court's discretion
State
v. Reeves,
670 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 10/8/2003)
Second-degree murder – weight of the evidence against finding
of malice. District
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering new trial for defendant
convicted by jury of second-degree murder based its ruling that the
finding of malice was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
(District court cited evidence preponderating heavily in
support of provocation sufficient to overcome the presumption of
malice aforethought where female defendant shot and killed victim:
“[t]he victim’s size, his drunken stupor, his intentions as
indicated by his unwanted pass at his mother’s home, his subsequent
sexual assault, the circumstances under which and place where the
sexual assault occurred, [defendant’s] past history of being
violently raped, no history of violence on [defendant’s] part, and
the very short interval of time between the sexual assault and the
shooting…” and found it supported by additional evidence.)
|
