April, 2004

(No Iowa Supreme Court opinions in March)

State v. Baker, 2004 WL 737047 (Sup. Ct. No. 02-0968) (Iowa 4/7/2004)  Rape shield law and balancing probative-vs.-prejudicial.  Prior false report of sexual activity by a present alleged sexual abuse victim does not fall within the protection of the rape shield law, Iowa R. Evid. 5.412(b).  In addition, the kind of embarrassment that a complaining witness might suffer as being shown to be “a boaster or even a liar” “is not the kind of unfair prejudice that will outweigh the probative value of clearly relevant evidence”.  Thus, the district court “abused its discretion in excluding the evidence of the prior false claim of sexual behavior” in defendant’s trial for third-degree sexual abuse.

State v. Green, 2004 WL 737080 (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0639) (Iowa 4/7/2004)  OWI – who is statutorily qualified to draw blood sample.  Iowa Code section 321J.11 only permits licensed physicians, licensed physicians’ assistants, medical technologists, or registered nurses to withdraw blood samples for alcohol content testing.  Phlebotomists, one of whom extracted defendant’s blood sample in this case, are not specifically enumerated in that list.  District court’s determination, without evidence on the question of phlebotomists’ education, licensure, training, or overall qualifications, that they “as a class simply do not have the sufficient education to be technologists” was insufficient.  Because the group may fall within the term “medical technologist” as used in section 321J.11, the Supreme Court reverses and remands for a hearing and determination on this issue.  “The test to determine whether a person holding himself out as a medical technologist … is whether a satisfactory showing can be made that he has sufficient training in the withdrawal of the blood to accomplish the legislative objectives of protecting the individual’s health, guarding against infection and pain, and assuring the accuracy of the test, all in accordance with accepted medical standards.”  State v. Winquist, 247 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 1976). 

State v. Mallett, 677 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 4/7/2004)  Appeal – district court lack of jurisdiction during.  District court did not have jurisdiction to rule on defendant’s motion for new trial filed after defendant appealed his conviction.  The district court is divested of its jurisdiction when an appeal is taken.  Jurisdiction can be accomplished only by two means:  (1) the litigants’ stipulation for an order of dismissal or (2) an appellate court’s order for limited remand.  Otherwise, the district court maintains jurisdiction only over issues that are merely collateral to issues on appeal.  A motion for new trial based on an alleged failure to arraign the defendant is not collateral.

State v. Morris, 677 N.W.2d 781 (Iowa 4/7/2004).  Theft – insufficient evidence of intent to permanently deprive.  Apprehension of stolen car within a short time of defendant’s taking it and then fleeing from it after being stopped by the police “does not defeat the possibility that there was an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property at the time of the taking, [but] it is a circumstance that severely limits the circumstantial evidence from which that intent can be inferred.”  Remanding the case for the entry of judgment on the [duly submitted] lesser-included-offense of “operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent”, the Court also rejects the State’s argument that defendant’s abandonment of the vehicle and flight therefrom were not indicative of the requisite intent, but instead were acts “that would ordinarily assure that the truck would be returned to its owner.” 

State v. Petersen, 2004 WL 737706 (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0912) (Iowa 4/7/2004)  Trial informations.  Trial court erred in dismissing trial information because of a problem with the underlying complaint and affidavit (the affidavit bore a notary date that was the day before the crime occurred).  Because the trial court subsequently approved the trial information, it determined there was probable cause to detain defendant and require him to answer to the charge.  “[A]ny defect in the affidavit attached to the complaint was moot and not grounds for dismissal of the trial information as a defect in the institution of the prosecution of the action.”

State v. Sullivan, 2004 WL 736840 (Sup. Ct. No. 02-0542) (Iowa 4/7/2004)  [1] Prior bad acts – abuse of discretion in admitting.  Rule 5.404(b), as established by first sentence therein, is to be an exclusionary rule with exceptions.  To the extent that the Iowa court “strayed from the exclusionary aspect of the rule” in State v. McDaniel, 512 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1994), that case is overruled.  “Whenever the prosecutor offers uncharged misconduct to establish an ultimate inference of mens rea, the court should require the prosecutor to ‘articulate a tenable noncharacter theory of logical relevance’”.  Here, the State’s offer of “a prior act of drug-dealing unconnected to the charge for which Sullivan was being tried” was inadmissible as (1) without an articulated valid, noncharacter theory of logical relevance to support an ultimate inference of intent to deliver, and (2) it was three years after the fact.   [2]  Appellate standards – nonconstitutional error.  Where nonconstitutional error is claimed, “the test for determining whether the evidence was prejudicial and therefore required reversal was this:  ‘Does it sufficiently appear that the rights of the complaining party have been injuriously affected by the error or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice?”  With error of this kind, prejudice is presumed unless the contrary is affirmatively established or unless defendant conceded the evidence or the same evidence was overwhelmingly clear in the record.

State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 4/7/2004)  [1] Right to counsel.  Trial court has a duty of inquiry when a criminal defendant makes a colorable claim (here, an alleged breakdown in communication to the extent that defendant was withholding evidence from his attorney) that substitute counsel should be appointed.  [2] Hearsay – excited utterance.  Trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing supposed statement by third party that he was the attacker (not defendant) as excited utterance, given that the statement was made some thirty minutes after the attack and was in response to a question.  [3]  Ineffective assistance – failure to object to superfluous jury instruction.  Counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the submission of an instruction that evidence was offered to show defendant had made earlier statements, their character and how they could be used.  Even assuming no such evidence had been admitted, making the instruction generally prejudicial as not substantiated by the evidence, defendant was unable to prove this as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the prejudice element.  The superfluous jury instruction did not present a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had counsel not erred in its submission.

State v. Weatherly, 2004 WL 737039 (Sup. Ct. No. 02-0904) (Iowa 4/7/2004) Conspiracy to manufacture meth – sufficiency of “conspiracy”.  Defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine was supported in the record, as distinguished from the insufficiency found in State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738 (Iowa 2001) (proof of conspiracy not established when 2 people are seen together at a meth lab, smell of ether, and flee after seeing the police), by virtue of additional evidence that (1) the motel room in which defendant was found had been rented by another person, suggesting the involvement of others and the primary purpose of manufacturing meth, (2) defendant “carried a distinctive portion of the meth lab with him as he left the motel” (the bottom half of a 20-oz clear plastic pop bottle that contained a coffee filter which smelled of ether) and (3) defendant’s false statement that he was only a “needle addict”.