|
Accomplice
and confession corroboration
State
v. Douglas, 675 N.W. 567 (Iowa 2/25/2004)
Accomplice and
confession corroboration.
A person cannot be convicted solely on uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice, Iowa R. Cr. P. 2.21(3). Similarly, a person
cannot be convicted solely on his or her own out-of-court
uncorroborated confession. Iowa R. Cr. P. 2.21(4). Significantly,
an accomplice's testimony may NOT be used to corroborate another
accomplice's testimony. However, accomplice testimony MAY be
used to corroborate an out-of-court uncorroborated confession, and an
out-of-court confession may corroborate the testimony of an
accomplice.
Late
filed motion does not waive suppression issue
State
v. Henriksen, 2004 WL 345514 (Sup. Ct. No. 02-1329) (Iowa 2/25/2004)
Late filed motion does not waive suppression issue.
Where trial court “could have” found an excuse for the late
filing, the Supreme Court on further review of the Court of Appeals
decision reaches the unspecified merits of a suppression issue and then, being
evenly divided, the trial court’s suppression order is affirmed by
operation of law. Click
HERE
for Court of Appeals' ruling in this case. (Ordered NOT published;
click HERE for
rule on use of unpublished opinions).
Unwarranted
entry of curtilage violates 4th amendment
State
v. Lewis, 675 N.W. 516 (Iowa 2/25/2004)
Unwarranted
search and seizure. Curtilage of house (here, fenced
backyard and enclosed rear porch) is protected area which may not be
entered absent a warrant or probable cause supported by an exigent
circumstance. Mere reasonable articulable suspicion does not
permit entry. In addition, there was no probable cause to
believe the crime of interference with official acts existed to
justify a "hot pursuit" entry when persons on curtilage
merely walked away and ignored officer's directions to stop.
Finally, probable cause was not created by landlord's "no
trespass" letter to police purporting to permit police entry to
arrest anyone but the named tenant. (Violation found under both
United States and Iowa constitution).
Social visitor of
apartment had expectation of privacy; suspected OWI did not justify
warrantless arrest in apartment
State
v. Lovig,
675 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 2/25/2004)
[1]
Search and seizure – entry of house for seizure and arrest
of visitor – expectation of privacy.
OWI defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
apartment of another, at which she regularly visited, babysat, and
occasionally (an average of three nights a week) stayed overnight.
The court described her relationship with the premises as a
“regular, fixed status as a social guest” as opposed to one whose
presence was for the purpose of “conduct[ing] a business
transaction”. [2]
Search and seizure – probable cause for arrest.
Probable cause for defendant’s OWI arrest existed where
defendant (1) quickly left the scene of a single-vehicle rollover
accident involving a vehicle registered to her and which she had been
driving (2) was observed by a witness prior to have alcohol on her
breath before leaving the scene, and beer bottles were found in
and near the vehicle.
[3]
Exigent circumstances to justify warrantless search and
seizure.
The gravity of the underlying offense is an important
factor when determining whether any exigency exists for a warrantless
arrest.
While OWI is a relatively serious crime, the “destruction of
evidence” claim underlying an exigent circumstances argument,
particularly when unaccompanied by hot pursuit, “may not be
compelling in all OWI cases.”
Exigent circumstances did not support a warrantless entry for
OWI arrest here, as (1) defendant would have been permitted to refuse
a chemical test, so the destruction of blood-alcohol evidence claim
“may be illusory”, (2) the time lapse achieved by a defendant who
“had been in the apartment for a period of time before police
arrived” gives the suspect a chance to skew any subsequent blood
test either by the ingestion of more alcohol or the natural
dissipation of blood alcohol through time, and (3) there was no
evidence regarding any efforts to seek a warrant or determine how
long that would take, nor was there any evidence that police suspected
defendant was “engaged in any purposeful activity … that would
destroy the integrity of any future chemical tests.”
Guilty plea not
properly entered
State
v. Meron,
675 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 2/25/2004).
[1] Preservation of error -- failure to challenge guilty plea with
motion in arrest of judgment. Defendant's acknowledgment in open
court that her attorney had informed her of the right to file a motion in
arrest of judgment did not substantially comply with the requirement that
she be advised that the failure to challenge the guilty plea by filing the
motion could preclude challenge on appeal. Even if counsel's
assurances that the right to file a motion in arrest was of the ilk of the
written waiver accepted as substantially complying with the requirements for
serious or aggravated misdemeanors, State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466,
468 (Iowa 2002) (an issue which the court declines to reach), counsel's
in-court assurance did not satisfy the 2nd requirement of the rule:
that defendant be told of the consequences of failing to file a
motion. [2] Sufficiency of the guilty-plea colloquy
requirements of Rule 2.8.2(b). "Absent a written plea of
guilty describing all the matters set forth in [rule 2.8(2)(b)],
noncompliance with oral requirements of the rule normally constitutes
reversible error." As such, where there is no written guilty plea
and the oral colloquy leaves out references to defendant's right to compel
the attendance of witnesses or that she could not be forced to incriminate
herself -- even when accompanied by an in-court confirmation that counsel
for the defendant discussed her trial rights with her -- there is no
substantial compliance with rule 2.8(2)(b). [3] When court
can waive the oral colloquy procedures in a plea to serious or aggravated
misdemeanor. Rule 2.8(2)(b), providing that the court in its
discretion and with the approval of the defendant may waive the
colloquy procedures in a plea of guilty to a serious or aggravated
misdemeanor, applies only when the court can use a defendant's written
acknowledgment to ensure that the plea is "voluntary, intelligent and
supported by facts." (emphasis added). In other words,
"[t]he waiver language of rule 2.8(2)(b) only means the full in-court
colloquy can be waived and the written plea can serve to establish
substantial compliance with the rule."
No
probable cause or reasonable grounds for traffic stop
State
v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 2/25/2004)
Invalid stop under Iowa constitution article 1, section 8. [1]
Probable cause for a stop. While officer's observation of a
traffic violation can constitute probable cause for a stop, driver
whose left tires momentarily crossed the left edge line (line between
two lanes going the same direction) as opposed to the "center
line" (here, the median dividing the two-laned northbound traffic
from the two-laned southbound traffic) does not violate Iowa Code
section 321.297(3) (driving to the left of the center line).
Likewise, probable cause did not support a stop for a violation of
section 321.306, requiring drivers to drive "as much as possible
in a single lane" and prohibiting movement from that lane unless
the operator has ascertained such movement can be accomplished
safely. Court holds that the State failed to prove by a preponderance any
objective basis to believe defendant's movement was done in violation
of the latter. [2] Reasonable suspicion for stop.
Court finds absence of reasonable suspicion that the driver was either intoxicated or
fatigued to justify a stop, where the vehicle's left tires
"briefly" crossed the left edge line but the stopping
officer could not recall whether the vehicle was weaving, did not
notice defendant show any sign of drowsiness, and testified that
defendant was not driving erratically.
Bad
acts evidence improper;
prosecutor conduct criticized
State
v. Werts, 677 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 2/25/2004)
[1] Prior bad acts evidence. Prejudicial error occurred in
allowing a witness to testify that defendant had once "slammed
[the child victim] down onto his bottom and then walked away from
him" as impeachment for defendant's in-court admission that she
had told the child's parents (after the child's fatal injury but
before his death) that she would "never hurt [the
victim]." The prior act
evidence was held not impeach the witness on the statement she made to the
child's parents. The Supreme Court also based its decision on
the fact that the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant included
a question that was bound to elicit a response favorable to the
defendant so as to be impeachable by otherwise inadmissible evidence,
akin to State v. Turacek, 456 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 1990). [2]
Improper prosecutor conduct. The Court condemns
prosecutorial cross-examination of defense expert which "injected
the issue of defendant's expert witness associating with defense
lawyers and representing and testifying for perpetrators charged with
killing children" as an "improper effort to demean the
witness". Court also characterizes prosecutor's questioning
of defendant regarding her failure to visit the injured child before
he died, attend his funeral, visit his parents, or go to the
gravesite; and accusatory questions as "grossly improper" as
"seeking to play upon the passions of the jury".
Finally, Court condemns conduct ("if it occurred" -- the
court notes that no record was made so the acts cannot be confirmed)
claimed to have been done by the prosecutor during closing as
follows: "[holding] a baby book in front of the jury",
stating the baby book would never be written, and tearing pages out of
the book and dropping them on the floor, as an "improper attempt
to appeal to the passion and prejudice of the jury".
|
