June, 2004

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, ___U.S.___ 2004 WL 1373207 (U.S. 6/21/2004).  [1] Nevada law requiring suspect to identify self when stopped pursuant to Terry-type requirements (based on reasonable suspicion) does not violate 4th Amendment.    Nevada statute requiring a suspect to give his name when stopped by police having reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime does not violate the 4th Amendment.  The Court based its ruling on analogous Terry stop principles, because the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion so as to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.  “A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Questions about a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops, and obtaining the suspect’s name serves important government interests. In addition, the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer consistent with the 4th amendment as long as the requirements for a valid Terry stop exist and the request for identification is reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. While the source of the legal obligation to answer questions is not the 4th Amendment, a statute may provide such an obligation:  “the threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity.”  [2] Nevada law requiring suspect to identify self when stopped pursuant to Terry-type requirements (based on reasonable suspicion) does not violate 5th Amendment.  The Self-Incrimination Clause protects against disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or that could lead to other evidence that could be so used. To qualify for the privilege, the communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled. Nevada statute requiring suspect to identify self when stopped by police (based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity) does not violate the self-incrimination clause.  Even if the identity requirement is testimonial, there is no violation because “in this case disclosure [of the suspect’s name] presented no reasonable danger of incrimination.”  The narrow scope of the disclosure requirement was also an important factor in the analysis.  However, the Court left open the possibility that “a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense”, in which case a determination would have to be made whether the Self-Incrimination Clause applies.

Missouri v. Seibert, ___U.S.___ (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 02-1371) (U.S. 6/28/2004).  Miranda warnings – requirement not met when withheld until confession is given.  Protocol that instructs police officers not to give Miranda warnings until after interrogation produces a confession, at which time Miranda is given followed by a second attempt to get the same confession, does not effectively comply with Miranda’s constitutional requirement.

United States v. Patane, ___ U.S. ___ (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 02-1183) (U.S. 6/28/2004).  Miranda -- Exclusionary rule does not apply to fruits of unwarned statement.  Failure to Mirandize an arrested suspect does not require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements.  “[T]he Miranda rule protects against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause, which, in turn, is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements.”

State v. Hartsfield, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 02-0635) (Iowa 6/16/2004).  Spoliation instruction – when required.   The proof required for a spoliation instruction (which allows the jury to infer from the State’s failure to preserve evidence that it would have been adverse to the State) is not the same as the proof necessary to establish a constitutional violation of due process rights due to the State’s destruction of evidence.  “[A] defendant can be entitled to a spoliation instruction without showing that a refusal to give the instruction would be an infringement of his right to due process.”  Under the non-constitutional analysis, the trial court does not have discretion to refuse a spoliation instruction when the defendant generates a jury question on four factors: (1) that evidence existed, (2) that it was in the possession or under the control of the State, (3) that it would have been admissible at trial, and (4) that the State intentionally destroyed the evidence.  Here, the Court held that all four factors were met regarding an alleged videotape of a police station booking area in the vicinity of which a later-charged scuffle occurred between defendant and officers, reversing the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction.  The tape was erased pursuant to a routine practice, which would normally not be considered an intentional destruction to justify a spoliation instruction.  However, the circumstances of this case supported a finding of intentional destruction because the State knew that defendant wanted to obtain the tape, both from defendant’s request and from that of his attorney.  Additionally, the Court finds prejudice because ‘[t]he adverse inference went to a key piece of evidence that would have provided a reliable record of what happened [that day]” and the evidence at issue was unique and not cumulative.

State v. Smith, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1062) (Iowa 6/16/2004).  Identification and warrant check of passenger of lawfully stopped car did not violate Fourth Amendment.  After issuing citation to driver of car stopped for disobeying a stop sign, police asked defendant (passenger) for identification, which defendant produced.  Officer relayed identification to dispatcher, who advised of outstanding arrest warrant for defendant.  Officer ordered defendant out of the car and arrested him on the outstanding warrant.  During search incident to arrest, packet of meth fell out of defendant’s pocket, resulting in drug charge.  Defendant claimed that officer was required to and did not have reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity before making an identification and checking it.  Even assuming the initial traffic stop ended after the citation was issued so that seizure of defendant would have required reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, there was no seizure of defendant.  “Smith was not seized:  under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the deputy’s request for his ID.”  Because defendant was not seized, the district court should not have granted his motion to suppress.