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State v. Tovar, ___ U.S. ___
(124 S.Ct. 1379) (Sup. Ct. No. 02-1541) (U.S. 3/4/2004).
Right to counsel - requirements for valid waiver of counsel at guilty plea proceeding.
The Sixth Amendment does not compel the two admonitions (first, that an attorney may provide an independent opinion whether it is wise to plead guilty and second, that without an attorney the defendant risks overlooking a defense) required by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Tovar, 656 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 2003) for a constitutionally valid waiver of counsel at guilty plea proceedings.
For a constitutionally-valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment to occur at the plea stage, defendant must be informed of: (1) the nature of the charges, (2) the right to be counseled regarding his plea, and (3) the range of allowable punishments upon the entry of the guilty plea.”
The general standard for a waiver to be considered knowing, intelligent and sufficient aware is whether the defendant fully understands “the nature of the right and how it would apply in general in the circumstances - even though the defendant may not know the specified detailed consequences of invoking it.” No specific formula or script is essential to a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel at the plea stage. The information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.
This case has been reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. The United States Supreme Court specifically noted that “States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful.” Crawford
v. Washington, 541
U.S. _, 124 S.Ct. 1354_(Sup. Ct. No. 02-9410) (U.S. 3/8/2004).
Confrontation -- testimonial
statements. Out-of-court
statements by unavailable witnesses, given in a context so as
to constitute "testimonial" statements and offered
at trial even though defendant had no opportunity to
cross-examine on the statement, are not admissible under the
federal confrontation clause. This overrules Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) which allowed use of
out-of-court statements by unavailable declarants if the
evidence either (1) fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" or (2) bore "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" The
focus now will be on whether the out-of-court statement
constituted a "testimonial statement" of the
unavailable declarant so as to be inadmissible if there was no
prior opportunity to cross-examine. While the Court
declines to "spell out a comprehensive definition of
'testimonial'" it at least applies to "prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at
a former trial; and to police interrogations." The
analysis regarding non-testimonial
hearsay remains unchanged: "[w]here nontestimonial
hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers'
design to afford the States flexibility in their development
of hearsay law -- as does Roberts, and as would an
approach that exempted such statements from the Confrontation
Clause scrutiny altogether." |
