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Sexually violent predator:
“antisocial personality” can serve as underlying “mental
abnormality” as long as other statutory requirements met
In re the Detention of Allen Barnes,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 11/19/04) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1216).
Sexually violent predator – sufficiency of “antisocial
personality disorder” diagnosis in proving “mental
abnormality” element. Court
rejects claim that antisocial personality disorder cannot
serve to underlie a finding of sexually violent predator. The
statute does not limit the diagnoses that can constitute a
“mental abnormality” nor does it require that the condition
affect the emotional or volitional capacity of every person
with it. Instead, due process is satisfied if the condition
is proven to have the required effect on the individual
subject to commitment.
Sexually violent
predator: no requirement that court submit special
interrogatory on which of several mental abnormalities serve
as basis for predator finding.
In re the Detention of Jeffrey Goodwin,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 11/19/04) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0871).
Sexually violent predator: no error in denying special
interrogatory requiring jury to specify the mental abnormality
upon which it based its finding. Trial court did not err
in refusing to submit special interrogatory that would have
required jury to specify which of defendant’s three mental
abnormalities, including antisocial personality disorder,
underlay its verdict. Defendant claimed that due process
prevented a finding that antisocial personality disorder
satisfied the “mental abnormality” requirement. In another
ruling on the same day, the Court recognized in
In re
Detention of Barnes, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 11/19/2004)
(Sup. Ct. No. 03-1216) that antisocial personality disorder
can underlie the requisite “mental abnormality” element “so
long as the other elements of the statute are satisfied.” As
such, the jury was not required to determine which particular
mental abnormality applied.
Preservation of
error – contemporaneous reference to specific claim later
raised not necessary where all parties understood it was being
discussed; same sexual predator holding as in Barnes,
above
In re the Detention of Timothy Hodges,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 11/19/04) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1216). [1]
Preservation of error – specific reference to claim not
necessary for preservation where all parties were aware of its
consideration. “[A]n appellate
court will consider grounds not precisely raised in a motion
for directed verdict where the record indicates the trial
court, counsel, and both parties had no doubt what the grounds
for the motion were and these grounds were obvious and
discussed thoroughly in the court below.” [2] Sexually
violent predator – antisocial personality disorder. As
recognized in In re Detention of Barnes, ___ N.W.2d ___
(Iowa 11/19/2004) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1216), antisocial
personality disorder can underlie the requisite “mental
abnormality” element “so long as the other elements of the
statute are satisfied.”
Right to counsel –
effect of uncounseled prior convictions on subsequent
enhancement crimes – Iowa constitutional analysis
State v. Robert Arthur Allen,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 1/7/2005) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1947) Right to
counsel – effect of uncounseled convictions on subsequent
enhancement proceedings. The Iowa
Constitution does not forbid use of a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction for enhancement of a crime, even when
the prior conviction did not itself result in a term of
incarceration. “We find no persuasive reason to disagree with
Nichols [v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994)] on the facts
and arguments presented in this case, and … decline to
interpret the Iowa Constitution to afford more protection than
the federal constitution with respect to the use of prior
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions.”
Consent search:
Court finds insufficient evidence that consent which was given
extended to entire car
State v. McConnelee,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 12/10/04) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0989) Search
and seizure – insufficient evidence of consent to warrantless
search. Court holds, upon review of
videotape from officer’s car and in a finding contrary to
trial court’s determination of credibility, (“we are not
persuaded that the officer’s recollection of what the
defendant said is consistent with what can be confirmed by the
videotape or with our understanding of human behavior“) that
the State failed to meet its burden to prove the defendant
consented to a search of the entire vehicle. Court also finds
an absence of probable cause to extend the search beyond the
examination of the “leafy material” observed by the police
officer. Since the resulting evidence should have been
excluded from trial, case is remanded for retrial excluding
the fruit of illegal search.
Enticement of a
child crime – statutory inference [§ 710.10(4)]
unconstitutional
State v. Quinn, ___
N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 1/7/2005) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1643) [1]
Enticement of a child – statutory inference unconstitutional
on its face and as applied.
Inference that allows a finding of intent to commit enticement
of a child upon findings that (1) the violator is not known to
the child, and (2) the violator does not have permission of
the parent, guardian, or custodian to contact the child is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied. It allows
conviction merely upon proof of the act of speaking with a
minor which, without more, is protected under the First
Amendment. [2] Enticement of a child – sufficient evidence
of “enticement”. Defendant’s act of pulling his car in a
driveway in a way that blocked a female child’s ability to
reach her own driveway, making eye contact with her, smiling,
beckoning her to him and saying “come here” to her, along with
his later admission that he was sexually gratified by such
activities, provided substantial support for a finding that
defendant “enticed” the child under section 710.10(3).
Seizure – no
“seizure” occurred by officers’ approach and questioning of
pedestrian under circumstances (no show of authority,
intimidation or use of force)
State v. Reinders,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 12/17/04) (Sup. Ct. No. 02-1932). [1]
Search and seizure – no seizure.
Defendant was not “seized” for purposes of Fourth Amendment
when officers approached him while he was walking, engaged him
in conversation and asked for identification, all without any
show of authority, intimidation or use of force. [2]
Search and seizure – search of person pursuant to consent.
Warrantless search of a person’s pockets is valid if
pursuant to consent, which occurred here. (Court defers to
district court’s assessment of credibility where witnesses’
recollections of events differed).
Escape: escape
from physical restraint not necessary to constitute escape
under Iowa escape statute.
State v. James Harold Smith,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 12/17/04) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1663) Escape
– what constitutes. Defendant
“escaped” under Iowa Code section 719.4(1) (2003) when he left
the courthouse after sentencing for felony OWI and failed to
appear at the sheriff’s office as ordered by the court. By
fleeing the courthouse, defendant escaped “from the custody of
any public officer, employee, or any other person to whom the
person has been entrusted” under the escape statute. It is
not necessary that the person be physically restrained at the
time of escape: “custody is established if the individual ‘is
or would be subjected to immediate physical restraint if an
attempt to flee from the authorities was made.’” (quoting
State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1992)).
Evidence of prior bad
act evidence admissible to prove hostility in relationship as
acts of domestic abuse are sufficiently “connected” under
earlier ruling
State v. Nathaniel Taylor,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 11/19/2004) (Sup. Ct. No. 02-1268).
[1] 5.404(b) Evidence of prior bad acts admissible.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence that defendant was involved in two prior violent
altercations against his wife in a trial for domestic abuse
assault and burglary. The evidence was relevant to
defendant’s motive and intent beyond showing a mere propensity
to commit the crimes charged. Intent was a legitimate
contested issue at trial by virtue of defendant’s denial. His
prior conduct revealed the nature of the emotional
relationship between himself and the victim so as to be highly
probative of his probable motivation and intent on the charged
occasion. In addition, the evidence of intent was
particularly important and there was clear proof of the prior
assaults. The probative value was found to outweigh the any
overly prejudicial effect. (The Court distinguished this case
from State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19 (Iowa 2004) on
the ground that the prior acts were “connected” to the charged
acts in this case whereas they were not connected in
Sullivan: “Domestic violence is never a single isolated
incident. Rather, domestic violence is a pattern of behavior,
with each episode connected to the others.”) [2]
Sufficiency of the evidence: intent requirements for assault
and burglary. Sufficient evidence of assault (regardless
of nature of intent required and notwithstanding defendant’s –
and the victim’s – testimony to the contrary) and the intent
element for burglary where defendant broke the window of a van
in which his wife was a passenger and forcibly pulled her
out. “Given the fact the victim had been assaulted by the
defendant in the recent past and had just obtained a
no-contact order against him, the natural and probable
consequence of the defendant’s conduct was physical contact
that was insulting and offensive to the victim.” There was
also evidence that defendant intended to cause pain or injury,
having yanked violently on the [pregnant] victim four or five
times to get her out of the vehicle. [3] Motion for new
trial based on verdict allegedly contrary to the evidence.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion for new trial based on allegations that the
weight of credible evidence did not demonstrate the requisite
intent underlying his convictions. [4] Ineffective
assistance of counsel. Court disposes of ineffective
assistance claims that are related to the holdings listed
above – including (1) ruling that due process was not violated
by the admission of other crimes evidence because of the
holding that it was admissible under rule 404(b) and Rule 403
and (2) ruling on sufficiency of the evidence regarding bodily
injury element – and reserves for consideration in
postconviction proceedings those that are not. |
