September 1, 2004

State v. Corsi, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0978) (Iowa 9/1/2004).  [1]  Conspiracy to manufacture meth – sufficient evidence on “agreement” element.  Sufficient evidence of the “agreement” element of conspiracy to manufacture meth where (1) defendant matched the description of a person seen cooking meth in the basement of a house in which no one else matching that description was found upon immediate evacuation, (2) two police officers identified him as that person, (3) one’s presence and cooking of meth supports an inference of agreement (4) the person who lived in the apartment said he knew it was wrong to let the defendant cook meth in the apartment, and (5) defendant’s possession of lithium batteries and possibly chemical-soaked coffee filters indicated an agreement to participate in manufacturing.  The jury was not required to believe evidence that defendant was merely in the wrong place at the wrong time.  [2]  Jury instruction – counsel not ineffective in failing to object to marshalling instruction that incorrectly labeled 2 aiding and abetting alternatives as conspiracy theories.  Trial court’s inaccurate labeling of aiding and abetting alternatives as “conspiracy” alternatives was nonprejudicial to defendant as they were each appropriate bases for finding a violation of section 124.401(1), conspiracy not being a separate crime but rather simply one way to commit the crime.  [3]  Sentencing – enhancement for manufacturing in the presence of a minor incorrectly applied.  Enhancement for manufacturing in the presence of a minor was incorrectly applied to enhance sentence for conviction of conspiracy to manufacture meth.  “[T]he enhancement statute applies only to the manufacturing of methamphetamine, and because [defendant] was acquitted of that charge, his sentence is not subject to enhancement under section 124.401C(1).”

State v. Doggett, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0248) (Iowa 9/1/2004)  Ineffective assistance – allowing plea to felony eluding charge not supported by evidence.  Defendant who fled from police officers in a high-speed chase received ineffective assistance of counsel in agreeing to plea to felony eluding charge.   His failure to appear for trial ten days prior to the chase did not render him “participating in a public offense” during the chase.  While failure to appear may be a “continuing offense”, it does not necessarily amount to ongoing participation in a public offense.   Here, defendant’s participation in the crime of failure to appear seems to have begun and ended ten days before the car chase, upon his failure to appear for trial.

State v. Young, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0673) (Iowa 9/1/04)   To commit attempted murder, the defendant must do an act by which he or she expects to set in motion a force or chain of events which will cause or result in the death of the other person.  Here, defendant appealed instruction using the phrase “could cause” instead of “will cause”.  Court held that “will cause” refers to the defendant’s expectation of the consequences of the act, not the probability of the act’s success.  As such, “will cause” related to the type of act done in furtherance of the required specific intent to commit the attempted murder.  Factual possibility or probability of success is therefore “utterly irrelevant”.  In this (attempted suicide by police officer) context, the jury instruction referencing “could cause” is interchangeable with “will cause”, although the Uniform Jury instruction should be changed to reflect the statutory phrase “would cause”.