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Prior bad acts –
required showing for admission
under “identity” exception
In
the Interest of J.A.L., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 04-1163)
(Iowa 4/8/2005). Other acts evidence – journal entries
not admissible as character or other-acts evidence.
Juvenile accused of falsely reporting the
placement of an explosive device (Iowa Code section 712.7) did
not offer evidence of his character, so the admission of his
journal entries as evidence of character under Iowa R. Evid.
5.404(a)(1) constituted an abuse of discretion. Likewise, the
journal entries were not admissible under the 404(b) “other
acts” exception on the issue of identity. To be admissible
on this theory, the other acts had to be “strikingly similar”
or of a “unique nature.” J.A.L.’s journal entries did not
offer any indication he was preparing to place a bomb threat
in the school. As such, it was an abuse of discretion to
admit eleven exhibits containing the journal entries.
However, a de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence
excluding these entries resulted in the conclusion that the
evidence established beyond J.A.L.’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, justifying the delinquency adjudication.
Medical necessity not
a “necessity” defense
to marijuana manufacture charge
State v. Bonjour,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0309) (Iowa 2/11/05)
Defenses – medical necessity and marijuana. Court
declines to recognize a common-law defense of medical
necessity in a marijuana manufacturing case.
Vehicular homicide –
what “any amount”
means in context of underlying drug-based OWI
State v. Comried,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1166) (Iowa 3/18/2005)
Vehicular homicide while intoxicated – “any amount” of
controlled substance present. The term “any amount”,
referring to the presence of controlled substance in a person
who operates a motor vehicle so as to violate section 321J.2,
(which can also be the basis of a vehicular homicide charge if
the person unintentionally causes a death thereby) means what
it says: any amount greater than zero. The fact that the
initial test to determine the presence of drugs is performed
at certain “cutoff levels”, below which a negative test result
is given and above which a positive test result is shown, does
not factor in to the discussion of the presence of “any
amount” of drugs.
Child endangerment –
scope of “knowingly” element
State v. James,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-2031) (Iowa 3/11/05) Child
Endangerment – “knowingly” element. The “knowingly”
element of child endangerment – that the person “knowingly
act[] in a manner that creates a substantial risk to a child
or minor’s physical, mental or emotional health or safety” –
refers not only to defendant’s act but also to the
“substantial risk” factor. “We conclude it was error the for
the trial court to instruct that ‘knowingly’ refers only to
the defendant’s act. The instructions should have informed
the jury that it must find the defendant acted with knowledge
that she was creating a substantial risk to the child’s
safety.”
Statutory right to consult
counsel/family member:
timing, sufficiency of request;
Applicability of exclusionary rule for violation
of statutory right
State v. Moorehead,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1904) (Iowa 4/1/05)
Statutory right to consult family member after arrest or
detention – timing of request.
Suspect timely invoked the statutory right to consult a
family member while in the back of a patrol car, after failing
three field sobriety tests, a preliminary breath test, making
an incriminating statement, and displaying many symptoms of
drunkenness. The statute giving the right, 804.20, does not
require that the suspect make the request at the ultimate
place of detention. [2] Statutory right to consult family
member after arrest or detention – sufficiency of request.
Suspect’s request to speak with his mother was sufficient
to invoke the right afforded by section 804.20, even though it
was in the context of a discussion about the disposition of
the car he had been driving. He specifically, separately, and
unequivocally requested to talk to his mother, thus invoking
the statute. [3] Exclusionary rule applicable to violation
of statutory right to speak with family member. The
exclusionary rule not only bars the introduction of evidence
relating to a breath test, it also bars evidence but likewise
obtained after a violation of Iowa Code section 804.20, such
as this suspect’s post-test-result statement that he was
“drunk as hell”. [4] Exclusionary rule not applicable if
subject statement was spontaneous. Although statement was
made after suspect’s statutory right to speak with family
member was violated, it could have been admitted as
spontaneous if that circumstance was supported by the record.
As such, the Court remanded for determination whether the
statement was admissible as being spontaneous.
Prosecutor’s
references to defendant by
his nickname disapproved
State v. Wilkins,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0598) (Iowa 3/11/05)
[1] Appellate procedure – no dismissal of appeal as
sanction for escape. Court declines to dismiss
defendant’s appeal as a sanction for escaping from custody
during its pendency. [2] Jury selection – use of
peremptory strike to remove allegedly biased juror. Court
reaffirms its position that “the partiality of a juror many
not be made the basis for reversal [where] the juror has been
removed through exercise of a peremptory challenge.”
Prejudice is not presumed from the fact that defendant used a
peremptory challenge to remove an allegedly partial potential
juror. [3] Prosecutorial misconduct to refer to defendant
by nickname “O.J.”. Lawyers are charged with proceeding
in a dignified manner and not attempting to disparate the
dignity of other participants. This includes referring to
witnesses and parties by their proper names. Without knowing
what the prosecutor’s motive was in referring to defendant by
his nickname “O.J.”, the Court holds that these action
“clearly suggest that he was using this form of reference to
disparage defendant in front of the jury” (although no
objection was lodged and defense counsel once referred to
defendant by his nickname as well). Here, the disapproved
conduct did not warrant reversal because of an absence of
required level of prejudice.
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