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Sexually violent predator – failure
to give notice to AG within 90 days
In
re Detention of Damon Willis, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 1/21/05)
(Sup. Ct. No. 03-1877). Failure to give notice to
Attorney General within 90 days of prisoner's discharge.
"[A] failure to give the statutory notice [to the attorney
general, requesting review for potential commitment as a
sexually violent predator] at least ninety days prior to
anticipated discharge does not invalidate the proceedings
later taken on the attorney general's petition filed pursuant
to section 229A.4(1)."
Sexually violent
predator – timing of filing of petition (between verdict and
sentencing)
In
re Detention of Damon Willis,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 1/21/05) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1877).
Filing of petition during gap between jury verdict and
sentencing for sexual offense did not invalidate proceedings.
A gap between a guilty verdict and sentencing for a sexually
violent crime, during which the State's petition for a
sexually violent predator adjudication is filed, does not
invalidate the proceedings. "It is only necessary that the
subject be 'presently confined' for a sexually violent
offense... The basis for the sheriff's custody of Willis at
the time the petition was filed was the fact that he had
committed a sexually violent offense."
Sexually violent predator –
statutory but no constitutional right to counsel
In
re Detention of Damon Willis,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 1/21/05) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1877).
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims: sexually violent
predator proceedings. Right to counsel during sexually
violent predator determination flows from statute, not Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Any ineffective assistance claim
would therefore necessarily have to be grounded on something
other than the Sixth Amendment. (Court assumes without
deciding that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on
some source of entitlement other than the Sixth Amendment and
determines his claims are without merit).
Sexually violent
predator – no Due Process violation in considering sexually
violent act for which respondent is incarcerated as requisite
“overt act”
In
re Detention of Damon Willis,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 1/21/05) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1877)
Due process – no violation by not requiring recent overt
act beyond the sexually violent act for which the offender is
incarcerated, for determination of sexually violent predator.
The act for which a person is presently confined, if a
sexually violent act, may be deemed to be the recent overt act
that due process requires. A failure to require a showing of
a recent overt act other than the act for which he was
imprisoned does not violate substantive due process. In not
expressly requiring a recent overt act for petitions for
commitment filed under section 229A.4(1), the legislature
could reasonably conclude that the filing of a civil
commitment petition must necessarily be delayed during the
period of confinement under a criminal judgment and therefore
allow a petition to be filed at the conclusion of that
confinement notwithstanding the absence of an additional overt
act.
Opinion testimony –
proper objections in lieu of “invades the province of the
jury” and “asks for opinion on ultimate issue of law or fact”
In
re the Detention of Palmer,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2005) (Sup. Ct. No. 03-2004)
[1] Opinion testimony – invading the
province objection. The proper objection to a question
that asks the witness to opine whether a legal standard has
been met, where the legal standard is not explained and its
terms are not within the jurors’ common vernacular, is not
that it invokes an answer that “invades the province of the
jury” or causes the witness to testify to an ultimate fact.
If the standards are not understood, the danger is that the
answer will mislead the jury. The proper objections are that
the question calls for (1) a legal conclusion, (2) an opinion
that was not the proper subject of expert testimony, or (3) an
opinion whose probative value would be substantially
outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury. To preserve
the claim for appeal, the objector must identify the specific
legal terms making it objectionable so the questioner can
break it down. Here, the witness was asked essentially
whether respondent’s pedophilia made it likely that he would
engage in predatory acts of a sexually-violent nature if he
was not confined. That question contained two clauses that
needed further definition: “predatory acts” and
“sexually-violent”. However, defendant only challenged the
finding of likelihood, a notion understood by the jurors
without the need for additional definition, so there was no
prejudice from any objectionable parts of the question even
had error been preserved.
[2] Respondent in sexually violent
predator proceedings not entitled to a “presumption of not
being a sexually violent predator” instruction.
The respondent in a trial to determine the propriety of
committal as a sexually violent predator is not entitled to an
instruction that he or she was presumed not to be a sexually
violent predator. Respondent received the statutorily-based
instruction that the State had to prove the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt and that was all he was entitled to.
Pretextual arrests do
not violate the Iowa Constitution
State v. Griffin, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 1/28/2005) (Sup. Ct.
No. 03-1321). Search and seizure – Pretextual arrests do
not violate Iowa Constitution. Court specifically adopts
prior pronouncement that a “search incident to lawful arrest
is legal even if the arresting officer had an ulterior motive
for the arrest or had no independent probable cause to conduct
the search” as applicable to claims under article I, section 8
of the Iowa Constitution.
Statements given after defendant’s
illegal seizure inadmissible; defense counsel ineffective for
failing to move to suppress
State v. McCoy,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2/4/2005) (Sup. Ct. No. 02-1665) [1]
Search and seizure – illegal seizure would have caused
inadmissibility of resulting statement; trial counsel
ineffective in failing to challenge. Officers had
reasonable suspicion to stop the car that defendant was
driving because they believed it had been driven by his
brother, for whom they had a “pick order” as a material
witness in a murder investigation. However, after they
learned his identity the reasonable scope of the intrusion
ended. The Court rejects the State’s alternative argument
that defendant voluntarily went to the police station.
Instead, the Court holds that defendant was seized without
probable cause, taken to the police station against his will,
given his Miranda warnings, and questioned for more than two
hours during which he made incriminating statements. The
incriminating statements were obtained by exploitation of the
illegal detention and would have been inadmissible at trial.
Defense counsel was ineffective in challenging the admission.
The requisite degree of prejudice was shown by the fact that
defendant’s incriminating statements were crucial to his
conviction under an aiding and abetting theory such that a
reasonable probability existed that, but for trial counsel’s
failure to file the motion to suppress, the result of the
trial would have been different. [2] Involuntary statement
– promise of leniency. Officer’s acts of telling
defendant over 20 times during questioning that as long as he
didn’t pull the trigger he wouldn’t be in any trouble amounted
to promissory leniency that would have rendered defendant’s
subsequent statements inadmissible if challenged. Court
decides this on an "evidentiary" basis, noting that the State
filed no post-hearing motion asking to employ the federal
(constitutional) totality-of-the-circumstances test. Trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge on that
ground. On retrial, the State is precluded from using the
videotape of defendant’s induced statement, either in its
case-in-chief or for impeachment purposes. In addition, the
State cannot use defendant’s prior trial testimony on retrial,
either in its case-in-chief or for impeachment purposes. The
involuntary nature of the video statement tainted his trial
testimony, impelling him to testify. NOTE:
To keep the constitutional defense and the "totality of the
circumstances" analysis alive for appeal, prosecutors should
argue the applicability of that standard and the totality of
the circumstances test.
OWI – results of
marginal BAC test relevant and admissible in “under the
influence” OWI prosecutions
State v. Price,
___N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2/4/2005) (Sup. Ct. No. 04-0691).
OWI – proof of DataMaster result under .08 relevant in
“under the influence” prosecution. Trial court abused its
discretion by applying the wrong legal standard in suppressing
the results of defendant’s DataMaster blood alcohol test
(.081) in an OWI prosecution relying on the “under the
influence” alternative. The 5% “margin of error” statute,
321J.2(10), precluded the results for a prosecution based on
the “.08” alternative. However, the results were relevant in
a prosecution for the “under the influence” alternative.
Blood alcohol level is a relevant factor for consideration in
determining whether one was under the influence. In addition,
the probative value of the BAC was not unfairly prejudicial so
the probative value could not have been outweighed by that
factor. |
