January 14, 2005

Speedy trial:  no good cause for failing to try defendant within 90-day statutory speedy trial period; case remanded for dismissal

State v. Bradley Lee Winters, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-0737) (Iowa 1/14/05) Speedy trial – case dismissed for violation of 90-day speedy trial rule.   Defendant’s trial, conducted 41 days after speedy trial deadline had passed, violated his right to speedy trial and required remand for dismissal of charges.  Although defendant had filed motions, requested discovery, and was to be tried with codefendants who eventually waived their speedy trial rights, none of these factors constituted good cause here. Defendants do not waive their right to be tried within the speedy-trial deadline by filing timely pretrial motions nor do they forfeit the right by pursuing discovery.  Where neither the State nor the district court offered a reason to support the claim that the pending motions and discovery could not be heard before the expiration of the speedy-trial deadline, no “good cause” for the delay was shown.  Likewise, the fact that defendant was jointly charged (and even that the codefendants waived their right to speedy trial) was not a valid excuse:  “[A] defendant’s right to a speedy trial takes precedence over the state’s convenience in trying co-defendant’s together.  State ‘convenience’ in a joint trial is not of itself an exceptional circumstance … justifying an extension of the speedy trial period.”

 Preservation:  State must assert claims in the district court to preserve them for argument on appeal

State v. Mark Leonard Tubbs, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. No. 03-1765) (Iowa 1/14/05) [1] Preservation of alternative arguments by the State.  State waived its ability to claim on appeal that defendant’s suppression was untimely filed by failing to raise it in the district court.  [2] OWI – right to call attorney.  Section 804.20 requires an opportunity for arrestee to call or consult with a family member or an attorney but does NOT require that arrestee actually make the call, nor does it even require that the arrestee be informed of the right.  (Defendant stated he wanted his wife to read the consent form before he would agree to anything.  Because a no-contact order existed against defendant by his wife, the officers denied his request.  Defendant did not ask to contact any other family member or an attorney and refused to consent.  Officers were deemed to have fulfilled their responsibilities under 804.20.)  [3] Voir dire – not limited to list of challenges set out in rule 2.18(5).  Areas of voir dire questioning are not limited to what is set out in rule 2.18(5); counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to prosecutor’s voir dire regarding juror’s knowledge of symptoms of intoxication.  Further, no valid objection existed that prosecution was trying to bias the panel; it was reasonable to interpret the questions as a [valid] attempt to assess potential jurors’ understanding of what evidence was relevant on the question of intoxication, especially where there was no chemical test evidence.  [4]  Jury instructions – use of the word “innocent”.  Use of the word “innocent” and “innocence” in juxtaposition with “guilty” does not imply defendant had to prove his innocence.  The instructions as a whole made it clear that he was presumed innocent and the State had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.