July  2005

Sexual abuse residence requirements withstand myriad Constitutional challenges

State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005) (7/29/2005)  [1] Sexual abuse residence requirements -- Due Process Rational basis applies. "Although freedom of choice in residence is of keen interest to any individual, it is not a fundamental interest entitled to the highest constitutional protection." As such, the statute is not subject to strict scrutiny but rather is entitled to a rational basis review. [2]  Due Process substantive due process not offended. Court finds a reasonable fit between the government interest of preventing sex offenders from reoffending and the residency restriction statute. As such, "the residency restriction as applied to [defendant] does not violate substantive due process rights."  [3] Due Process procedural due process not offended. "The residency restriction arises from a validly enacted statute. As a statute based on status as a convicted sex offender, the minimum protections necessary under due process would be met by the notice under the statute and the trial. Furthermore, [defendant] has had ample opportunity to challenge the statute in court. Ultimately, each of these factors reveals that [defendant] has been provided adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. He has suffered no deprivation of his procedural due process rights." [4] Ex post facto -- statute does not violate ex post facto clause. The legislative intent behind the sex offender registry statute was not punitive so as to call into play the ex post facto clause. Further, application of the factors articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 567, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 661 (1963) to determine whether the statute is "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate" the nonpunitive intent (those factors being: [1] whether the law has been historically and traditionally considered to be punishment, [2] whether it promotes the traditional goals of punishment, [3] whether it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, [4] whether it has a rational connection to some nonpunitive purpose, and [5] whether it is excessive with respect to the nonpunitive purpose) results in a finding of non-punitive nature. In addition, the statute does not punish action that occurred before the statute's enactment nor does it increase punishment for a crime after its commission. [5] Self-incrimination -- Residency restriction does not work a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. "The residency restriction cannot serve to support a claim of self-incrimination because there is nothing about the restriction that compels sex offenders to be witnesses against themselves." (defendant did not make a self-incrimination challenge based on the registration requirement; but in any event the court notes that the challenge is premature because the normal remedy for a violation of this type would be exclusion of the incriminating statement at trial, not "wholesale invalidation of the statute.").  [7] Cruel and unusual clause not offended.  "We believe this threshold comparison in this case reveals that the two-year sentence for violating Iowa Code section 692A.2A is in appropriate proportion with the crime and thus is not cruel and unusual punishment." [8] Cruel and unusual disportionality analyzed.  "[T]he proportionality analysis is only used 'in the rare case when a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.'" Thus, the analysis begins with applying an objective test "measuring the harshness of the penalty against the gravity of the offense." (penalty for violating registration requirement as sex offender not unconstitutionally cruel and unusual).  [9]  Cruel and unusual punishment -- factors.  In deciding whether a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by imposing prohibited punishment, the first task is to consider the intent of the legislature. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1146-47, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164, 176 (2003). If the statute is intended to impose criminal punishment, then the legislative intent controls, and the law is considered to be punitive. Id. at 92, 123 S. Ct. at 1147, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 176. If the law was intended to be civil and nonpunitive, then we look to see if it is nevertheless "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate" the nonpunitive intent. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The latter involves the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 567, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 661 (1963): The factors articulated in Kennedy are helpful guides, consisting of the following: whether the law has been historically and traditionally considered to be punishment, whether it promotes the traditional goals of punishment, whether it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has a rational connection to some nonpunitive purpose, and whether it is excessive with respect to the nonpunitive purpose.

Guilty pleas -- Alford Pleas -- Court has authority to reject

State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa 2005) (7/1/2005).  In Iowa, the district court has discretion to accept guilty pleas from defendants who claim to be innocent where the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.